THE Prerogative of Man:

OR,

THE IMMORTALITY OF *HUMANE SOULES*

ASSERTED

Againſt the vain Cavils of a late worthleſſe Pamphlet,

ENTITVLED,

Mans Mortality, &c.

VVhereunto is added the ſaid Pamphlet it ſelfe.

GEN. 2.7.

Man became a living ſoule.

Ovid. Met. 1.

Os homini ſublime dedit.

OXFORD,

Printed in the yeare, 1645.

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THE PREROGATIVE OF MAN:

OR,

His Soules Immortality, and high perfection defended, and explained againſt the raſh and rude conceptions of a late Authour who hath inconſiderately adventured to impugne it.

I am the God of Abraham, *the God of* Iſaac, *and the God of* Jacob. *God is not the God of the dead, but of the living.* Matt. 22. 32.

Printed in the yeare 1645.

The Preface.

SO great and ſoveraigne to man hath been the benignity of indulgent nature, as that ſhe hath not onely beſtowed upon his ſoule, above thoſe of other creatures, the high and ſingular prerogative of immortality, but hath moreover imparted to him light whereby he might come unto the knowledge of it, and by that ſame knowledge be excited to make a diligent inquiry after the obligations that follow it, and how alſo in this life he may make his beſt advantages and preparations for the next. Neither is this ſame truth of immortality any new diſcovery, but acknowledged of old by the Heatheniſh and Pagan nations; of which thing we in the worke enſuing, are to give in a large evidence by our producing the many teſtimonies of a full and frequent Senate of ancient Sages, who being deſtitute of revelation had nothing but nature to inſtruct them.

To theſe I adde now, and for a taſt in the beginning preſent my Reader with onely two, the one taken out of the 12 *Booke of* Marcus Antoninus Auguſtus, *the other out of* Simplicius *his Commentaries upon* Epictetus, *one of theſe witneſſes, a Stoicke Philoſopher; the other, a Peripatetique; in performance of which omitting the Greeke citations as a diligence for the moſt part unneceſſary in an Engliſh worke, behold the words of Antoninus.* Haſt thou (*ſaith he*) forgotten that the minde or ſoule of every man is a God? *He meanes by the word* God, *onely an entity divine and a ſubſtance of higher and nobler extraction, then other formes or ſoules of creatures inferiour.* Simplicius *in his* Prolegomen. *determines, ſaying,* The ſoule maketh uſe of the body as of Organs or Inſtruments, as alſo it doth of the paſſions irrationall, and hath a ſubſtance altogether ſeparable from them, and remaining after their corruption. *The ſelfe ſame doctrine is delivered expreſſely and at large by* Porphyry *in his Booke* De Abſtinentia.

Againſt theſe powerfull impulſives and clearer notions of truth the adverſe

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adverse party hath nothing to oppose but meere surmises or suspicions, such namely as the Author of the Booke of Wisedome out of their owne mouthes recordeth, saying, There hath not any one beene knowne to have returned from the Grave. *Or else such as* Pliny *doth imagine, who grasteth the opinion of immortality not upon an innate or naturall longing and appetite, as he should have done, but contrariwise upon a false ambition and greedinesse in man of never ceasing to be: Or againe, as* Lucian, *who brings nothing to make good what he conceiveth, besides down-right impiety dressed up and set forth with facetious scoffes and derisory jestings, wherewith nevertheless sundry ill affected spirits and feebler understandings are easier perswaded, then with solid arguments.*

The Chorus of Seneca *afterwards alleadged moved as it may seeme with no better or stronger arguments, is driven as by a storme into darke and doubtfull cogitations touching the soules mortality, and so is another Chorus consisting of* Mahumetan Alfaquies *in the English Tragedy of* Mustapha. *By such shadowes also as these a late Philosopher was affrighted, and before him some of the ancients, so farre forth as to be made imagine, that granting the soule should survive the body, yet that it would not thence follow it were perpetuall, but that contrarywise in tract of time it might decay and vapour it selfe at length to nothing, burning or wasting out it's owne substance like a torch or candle; or at least have a period of duration set it, connaturally to the principles of constitution, beyond which it was not to passe, but at that terme or point presently and naturally to extinguish or returne to nothing.*

But if suspicions may come to be examined, we shall finde that there be other of them perswading the soules mortality that seeme more hollow and deceiptfull then the former are; as namely, a depraved appetite or an unbridled and untamed sensuality that solicites perpetually to be satisfied, and is desirous, without feare of future reckonings in the other world, to wallow and tumble like a swine in the mire of dirty pleasures, and to conceive some shadow of security for it, that so with the old Epicureans it might merrily say,

Ede, bibe, lude, post mortem nulla voluptas.
Eate, and drinke, and play thy fill,
There's after death nor good nor ill.

Doubtlesse these latter perswaders seeme to be more ruinous and corrupt then the former, and of more dangerous consequence; And thus we see, that on either side there want not suspicions as well for concluding of mortality as of immortality, if we will be guided by them. But into this high Court of judicature wherein causes so weighty and so grave as this

are to be decided, ſuſpicions and darke imaginations will not be allowed for evidence, or be able to caſt the buſineſſe any way.

To theſe other proofes which after I alleadge I adde this one which I have placed in the frontiſpeice of this treatiſe, namely theſe words of Chriſt, Matth. 22. *partly recited by him out of Exodus*: I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Iſaak, and the God of Jacob. God is not the God of the dead, but of the living. *By force of which Text the Sadduces who denied the reſurrection were convinced, and not onely they but this Author alſo againſt whom we deale, for the place proves the ſoules immortality, as well as the bodies reſurrection, Becauſe if God be the God of Abraham after death, then muſt his body one day riſe againe, to the end that being reunited with the ſoule there might reſult an Abraham; againe, if he be the God alſo of the living then muſt his ſoule continue living without any intermiſſion from death; for as without a body there is no Abraham, ſo without a ſoule there is no* vivens, *or thing endued with life. If you object, that it is ſufficient if it live then when the body is to riſe, though not before; I anſwer, that this intermitted living neither is nor can be ſufficient, becauſe then the ſoule muſt have a revivall & reſuſcitation, for the which we have no warrant any where, & feign it we muſt not; or if we do, it will want weight and be rejected. It followes then, that the ſoule of man after the departure of it from the body muſt either alwaies live or never, and ſo by conſequence ſeeing the ſoule muſt live once more it muſt live alwaies, that is to ſay, not onely at the reſurrection, as this Author ſaith, but continually from the time of the ſeparation to the time of the reunion, and ſo after everlaſtingly. And this is the concluſion was intended. And thus much touching the argument of the treatiſe following.*

Now touching the Adverſary I am to let you know, that if the Readers had not deſerved much more regard then he, and beſides if the matter had not required ſome elucidation, more then his objections did an anſwer, I had beene wholly ſilent and ſpared all this labour I have taken.

The Contents of the ſeverall Chapters in *The Prerogative of Man.*

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The Contents of the ſeverall Chapters in *Mans Mortality.*

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The

The immortality of humane ſoules aſſerted againſt the vaine Cavills of a late worthleſſe Pamphleter, and vindicated from reproach.

CHAP. I.

The Authours Deſigne, and the occaſion of it.

AS bodies that are foule and doe abound with peccant humours be ſubject to contagion and apt to be infected by each weake venome, from the danger whereof cleaner and better tempered bodies live ſecure, ſo, in like manner, mindes that be corrupted and all ſuch underſtandings as have loſt the ſtayes and principles of truth are eaſily entrapped by every poore and childiſh ſophiſtication; and having once left their anchour-hold floate afterwards up and downe upon the waves of humane opinations, are daſht againſt every rocke of errour, be it never ſo low, or contemptible, and, like unto ſmall weake flyes, be caught and entangled, not alwaies by the ſtrongeſt and moſt artificially woven cobweb, but by the very next, though never ſo rude and ſlender. This poore and ſorrowfull manner of failing muſt needs be of all other the moſt hatefull, not for the deadlineſſe of it, but rather for the reproach which followes; for by it a man looſeth not truth alone, but withall his reputation and eſteeme, it being a judgement very ſlenderly armed that with a wooden dart can be peirced through. Experience verifies what I affirme; for of late a ſorry Animal, better I cannot call him, whoſe ſoule he himſelfe thinkes to be mortall, and whoſe learning and capacity is ſo ſmall, as if indeed it were ſo as he imagineth it to be, a ſorry Animal I ſay, having ſtept into the crowde

of Scriblers in the defence of an old rotten hereſy condemned and ſuffocated by conſent of the wiſe, almoſt at the houre of the birth, hath met with ſome ſoules ſo unhappy as to be perſwaded by him, and to thinke as meanely of themſelves as the wiſeſt of all ages did of beaſts; and to the diſhonour and debaſing of their owne kind, not elevating Beaſts to the degree of reaſon, as ſometimes *Plutarch*, *Sextus Empiricus*, and ſome others have ſought to doe, though vainely, and peradventure more for oſtentation and argumentation ſake, then in any earneſt; but contrariwiſe reproachfully depreſſing man even as low as bruite beaſts, and aſcribing to them both a mortality alike.

The old and deſpicable hereſy which this obſcure authour now labours to reſuſcitate and to conjure up, was raiſed in *Arabia* about the time of *Origen*, and extinguiſhed by his diſpute, immediately after the birth, as *Euſebius* witneſſeth *l.6. Hiſt. c.*30. and according to the diviſion of *Ruſinus*, 27. ſuch as were infected with this errour were termed by Saint *Auguſtine de Hæreſ. c.*83. *Arabici*, by reaſon of the Province from whence the errour firſt aroſe: ſo that ſuch as now ſubmit unto it may well be termed wilde *Arabians*, which kinde of people by reaſon of their rude condition and volatile natures, were ever as ready to be coſened, firſt, by this hereſy, and after, by the grand Impoſtour Mahomet, as the Romanes prepared to betray their owne liberty, then when *Tiberius* cried ſhame upon them for it, ſaying, *O homines ad ſervitutem paratos*! O men prepared for ſervitude! who if he had lived in this age, and noted the pronity of men now adaies, to embrace every groundleſſe fancy and to forgoe any antient and well grounded truth, would have changed a word or two and ſaid, *O mentes ad errorem paratas!* O mindes prepared for errour! O mindes corrupt enough for the receiving and applauſe of any folly, of any errour, be it never ſo abſurde, diſadvantageous unto them, or derogating from the dignity of humane nature! *O curvæ in terris animæ*! About the time of theſe *Arabici*, *Tatianus* in an Oration of his yet extant ſeemes to have held with them, and afterwards ſome later Sectaries termed by reaſon of this their fooliſh errour *Thnetopſychitæ*, as *Damaſcene* relateth *l. de Hæreſ.*

Upon the conſideration of thoſe errours that have of late infected us and betrayed humane nature, I cannot thinke it a thing improbable, but that the infernall ſpirit which hath ſuggeſted them and governed the hearts of men as a predominant planet, in theſe Northerne Provinces of *Europe*, is that martiall Devill called *Apocal.*9.11. *Abaddon*, or *Apollyon*, that is to ſay, a Deſtroyer; for as much as the deſignes of all ſuch

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as have disturbed our peace of late daies, are all generally for ruine and destruction; the former acts were for destruction of Prelacy, or power Ecclesiasticall; the latter for subversion of regality, or sacred rights of Princes: they began with the destruction and prophanation of sacred and religious edifices, now they take the same licence for ruinating of of Cathredrall and Collegiate Churches, and like true Barbarians, what time and leasure doe not yet give them leave to demolish, that they at least deface and contaminate, leaving behind them nothing but desolation; neither sufficed it to have beene contumelious to their owne ancestours, unlesse besides they should prove treacherous and false even unto their owne nature, by their divesting and disrobing it of all the cheifest ornaments, which, according to the judgement of the wisest, doe appertaine unto it.

For first, what is the wealth and treasure of man, but the dignity and value of his actions? of this he hath long since beene plundered. His eyesight whereby his steps were to be guided, was his knowledge; but this divers have laboured to extinguish, by denying, with the old *Academickes* and late *Socinians*, that there is any certainty in it, and by becoming so witty as to know nothing. His crowne and life was the immortality of his better part, as therein cheifely being superiour to beasts and all other living things irrationall; but behold here a privy but a dangerous traitor endeavours to despoile him of it; so that in fine, if all these treacherous assailants might have their wills, he shall be wholly mortall, poore, feeble, blinde and miserable, dethroned from his wonted dignity, and cast downe unto the lower classe of Beasts. *Profectò plurima homini ex homine mala*, as *Pliny* justly complaineth, though he himselfe be one of the Authors of these evills. Was it not enough that all inferiour creatures doe rebell against us, but we must basely and treacherously conspire against our selves? The man that going from *Jernsalem* to *Jericho* fell amongst theeves, had hard measure offered him, for he was despoiled and wounded by them, and left onely halfe alive; but those theeves amongst whom we are now fallen be farre more cruell, for they would kill us outright both in soule and body, and with lesse then this will not be contented. But now it is time we examine what urgent reasons, what killing arguments there were that moved this new author unto so extravagant a course of rigour against all mankinde; for if these be not very urgent and invincible, we must conclude this man guilty not onely of much folly but also of heinous malice and temerity against the rights and prerogatives of man.

Chap. II.

His first Classe of arguments examined and refuted.

His first arguments be drawen from mans creation, fall, restitution and resurrection: the principall is this,

That what of *Adam* was immortall through Innocency, was to be mortalized by transgression.

But whole *Adam* (*quatenus animal rationale*) was in Innocency immortall.

Ergo all and every part even whole man liable to death by sinne.

Upon this bungling argument or syllogisme the weight of all his cause must leane, which as I perceive by the posture it should have been a syllogisme, if the Author could have cast it into that forme, but since that might not be, we will be contented to take it in grosse as it lies, rather then passe it over without an answer. We grant then that indeed all *Adam* for example, by sinning became mortall, and all and every part of him, that is to say, he was after so much of his age expired, to yeild up to death and be totally corrupted; or, which is all one, he was to have his two essentiall parts disunited, and after that untill the resurrection, neither he nor any of his parts thus dissevered & disunited to be *Adam* or a man any longer. All which might be without that, either the matter of his body, or substance of his soule should perish, or be destroyed. And forasmuch as concernes the matter of his body, it is an evident case because matter is a thing both ingenerable and incorruptible, and so neither produced by his generation, nor destroyed by his corruption; and as by generation onely fashioned and united, so againe by corruption or death, onely defaced and disunited or dissolved. And as for the soule the other part, there is no more necessity death should destroy it, then there was it should destroy the matter, there being no more reason for the one then for the other. Wherefore Saint *Paul* wishing death that so he might be with Christ, did not desire to be destroyed, as this silly authours doctrine would inferre, but to be dissolved; for surely if his soule by act of mortality was to have beene destroyed, he could not thinke to be with Christ, during the time of that destruction, or dissolution which he wished, and so his words and wishing would have beene very vaine, seeing according to this Author he should by his being dissolved, come never the sooner to be with Christ; because according to this Author, neither alive, nor dead, he was to come unto

him

him before the Generall reſurrection; nay further, his wiſh would have made againſt himſelfe and his owne ends, becauſe he knowing Chriſt a little in this life, might in ſome ſmall meaſure injoy him in it; but if by death his ſoule be killed as well as his body, he ſhould have no knowledge at all nor comfort of Chriſt, but be caſt farther off then he was before.

Now, as all agree, that matter throughout all mutations, remaineth incorrupted; ſo alſo according to the judgement of ſundry knowing men and diligent inquirers into the workes of nature and tranſmutation of naturall compounds, naturall aud materiall formes themſelves alſo doe not periſh at their parting from their matters, but onely are diſſolved and diſſipated, lying after that, in their ſcattered atomes within the boſome of nature, from whence they were before, by force of the ſeed, extracted, the reſult of whoſe union was the forme. So that the entity of the forme remaines after corruption, though not in the eſſence and formality of a forme, or totally and compleatly. Thus teacheth the learned author of *Religio medici*, and exactly declares himſelfe; of the ſame minde is the famous late Phyſitian *Daniel Sennertus* in his *Hypomnemata*, though ſometimes not ſo fully; as for example, when he aſcribes to formes precedent the full production of the ſubſequent; aſſigning *a vis prolifica* in every forme for multiplying of it ſelfe: by which doctrine he ſeemes to recede from his former principles of Atomes and not to ſticke conſtantly to them, yea and beſides to deliver a conceit which is hardly underſtood, and which moreover ſeemes to be improbable; for, who can explicate what one forme does when it multiplies another, or what kinde of cauſality it doth then exerciſe, or by what ſtrange influence that effect is wrought and the forme made up of nothing. This ſame doctrine of *Religio Medici*, and that alſo which we deliver here touching the Origination of formes was the doctrine of old *Democritus* expreſſed by him in his conſtitution of Atomes, or *minima naturalia*, not that every Atome did conteine a forme, as *Sennertus* ſeemes to thinke, but rather ſeverall peeces for the compoſition of it; as every ſimple, or ingredient of *Diacatholicon*, for example, is not *Diacatholicon*, but conteines ſomething in it of which it is to be made up, and from which as from differing heterogeneall parcells, collected and united by an artificiall mixtion it reſults; and for want of putting this difference or reſtraint, *Sennertus* his owne doctrine and explication of *Democritus* may ſeeme defective. This alſo was taught by *Anaxagoras*, when he affirmed all to be in all, or every thing, and to have a preexiſtence in the boſome of

nature before ſuch time as by the operation of ſeminall cauſes, formes be accompliſhed and made to appeare in their owne likeneſſe upon this theater. This is alſo the judgement of *Athanaſ. Kircherius* a late learned writer *l.* 3. *de magnete, part.* 3. *c.* 1. where he ſhewes how rich compounds earth and water be, as *Chymique* induſtries for ſeperation, have diſcovered, inſomuch as in them, as he noteth, is conteined a παισπερμία or generall magazine; the common matter being from the firſt creation, not leane and hungry, but *feta* and *præſeminata* with formes partiall and incompleate. This alſo is the inchoations of formes and the *rationes ſeminales* præëxiſtent, which many learned men have often favoured, and which, being thus explained, and in which this ſence of ours can ſuffer nothing from the objections of *Gandavenſis*, or *Durandus*. This laſtly, is nothing elſe, but in a good ſence, an eduction of formes *ex potentia materiæ*, which is *Ariſtotles* and his Diſciples Doctrine; for, it cannot be thought, that *Ariſtotle* ever intended to preſſe, or ſqueeze any formes out of the dry *skeleton* of *materia prima*, which matter is a principle onely receptive, and no promptuary out of which to educe a forme by virtue of any naturall agent whatſoever; for in ſuch a ſpare entity as that what fecundity is imaginable? And ſo much touching the originall of formes, which is one of the abſtruſeſt and niceſt points in all philoſophy, and that which by vulgar authors is meanlieſt handled, and by the wiſeſt is knowne but by conjecture.

Thus his maine argument is anſwered, after which all the reſt will fall downe headlong with any light touch, though but of a finger.

Immediately after this he argueth out of *Gen.* 3. 19. where *Adam* is told, that for his diſobedience, he muſt turne into that duſt of which he was made; out of which he concludes, that all and every part of *Adam* muſt be converted into duſt: which, if it be ſo, as he ſayeth, then not only his earthly particles, but his aiery, watry and fiery partes muſt to duſt alſo, and not only his body, but his ſoule, if he have any, muſt be turned into the ſame matter. See what fine concluſions follow out of this mortall ſoules philoſophy. It ſufficed then, that ſo much of his body, or of the whole man was to returne to duſt as had beene made up of it. And by this alone, the commination of God is fullfilled without any more adoe.

After this he comes upon us with his falſe Latin, ſaying as followeth. "Death reduceth this *productio entis ex non ente ad Non-entem*, "returnes man to what he was before he was": that is, not to be, &c. and by and by, citing impertinently two or three places of Scripture,

falls

falls to another argument drawen from the reſurrection.

As for the Latine word *Non-entem* whether it be right, or no, we will not examine, but apply our ſelves to the conſideration of the ſenſe which is as faulty as the Latine can be: know therefore in breife, that death did not reduce *Adam* to *non ens*, but to *non Adam*; it did not cauſe him abſolutely not to be, but onely not to be man, or *Adam* any longer. And foraſmuch as concernes his body, it is confeſt and certaine, that it was not turned by death or mortality into nothing, or *non ens*, but into duſt which is an *ens*, or ſomething; that is to ſay, his body was not *annihilated*, but corrupted; and to dye, is not wholly to be deſtroyed, but partially only, which act is all one with diſſolution. Now, if to the totall mortalizing of man, it be not neceſſary that his body be deſtroyed, then can it not be needfull that his ſoule ſhould be ſo, and thus our adverſaries ſtout argument is more then mortalized, for it comes to nothing, which man by dying does not.

We will not deny him, but that the ſoule of man did die and die againe, as much as it was capable of death; for firſt it dyed by the being ſeperated from the body; ſecondly, by being ſubjected unto damnation, which, as we know, is called in ſcripture a ſecond death. But as for the annihilation of it, or of the body, that is it which we deny; and ſo to doe we have juſt reaſon. In fine, as generation is nothing but the union of the parts, and not the creation or abſolute production of them; ſo againe, Death and Corruption is nothing but the diſunion, or diſſolution of them, and in no wiſe the annihilation, according as this wiſe Author would perſwade us.

As for the article of the Reſurrection, it proves nothing againſt the perpetuity of the ſoule; for we never read of any reſurrection beſides that of the body: wherefore, to averre a reſurrection of ſoules were a grand foolery, and a doctrine never debateable or heard of amongſt Chriſtians, till this ſilly Author came to teach it. And ſo much for his firſt chapter.

Chap. III.

Scripture no way a favourer of the ſoules mortality.

His places cited out of ſcripture in favour of his errour are ſo impertinent, as that it were no ſmall peice of folly to examine them one by one; They all of them ſignifie that man ſhall dye, or ſometimes, that *Joſeph* or *Simeon* is not, as *Gen.* 42. 36. all which how they are to be

be expounded and understood, may sufficiently appeare by that which hath beene said in the precedent chapter, and how againe they make nothing at all against the soules immortality.

Touching the words of *Ecclesiastes c. 3.* the answer is, that they were no determinations, or resolves, but a history, or an account given of what sometimes came into his thoughts, and what obscurities and desolations of soule he had, and what lastly was one of the first difficulties that troubled him and stirred him up unto a sollicitous enquiry; for certainely thisone verity of the mortality of mans soule is that which is to order his designes, to regulate his actions, and to put life and vigour into them, this being a truth most fundamentall. We see this one was it which moved *Clemens Rom.* (if he be the true Author of that which passeth under his name) to a serious inquiry and care for the finding out what he was to do, whom to consult, what to esteeme most, and in fine what to feare, or hope most, and how to order all the passages of his life. This is the question that usually troubles men first of all, and till a resolution be had, suffereth their hearts not to be at quiet, every man at first suspiciously, as *Solomon* did, asking of himselfe, as *Seneca* gallantly expresseth, saying.

Clem. l. 1. recogn.

Senec. in Troade

Verum est? an timidos fabula decipit
Umbras corporibus vivere conditis?
Cum conjux oculis imposuit manum,
Supremusque dies Solibus obstitit,
Et Tristes cineres urna coërcuit.
Non prodest animam tradere funeri,
Sed restat miseris vivere longius?
An toti morimur? nullaque pars manet,
Nostri cum profugo spiritus halitu
Immistus nebulis cessit in aëra,
Et nudum tetigit subdita fax latus?

Is it a truth? or that our feares
Have buzz'd a fable in our eares?
That mans hovering spirits doe live
And their interred corps survive.
When greived consorts hands do close
Their eyes, and their last dayes oppose
Our bright *Hyperions* beamy light,
And drownes the slender shades in night
Then when our bones to ashes burne,
To be confin'd within an urne.

Be not the funeralls our fate
But there must be a longer date
For wretched man? Or doth he dye
Intirely, and entombed lye?
Or may he not forthwith consume
And vanish all in slender fume
Then when his wandring spirit flyes
And mingles with the aiëry skies.
And when the dismall funerall torch
His side insensible doth scorch.

After this sort do anxious and afflicted spirits often times argue and dispute within themselves, laying before their eyes all the doubts and difficulties immaginable before they descend to the making of any conclusion at all, or to the determining of any settled doctrine. Thus, and no otherwise did *Solomon*, when first revolving in his thoughts the matter of the soules condition, and touching upon the various suspicions of men concerning it with no small sense and anguish of mind, at length *c.* 12. drawing to a conclusion, determines saying, let the dust returne unto the earth from whence it came, and the spirit unto God who gave it. And this text alone is sufficient to confound the Adversary, and to confute whatsoever he hath endeavoured to draw out of scripture for mans totall corruption and mortality. *Eccles* 12.

Chap. 4.

His argument out of reason viewed and examined.

WHat the severall fancies were of heathen Philosophers touching the nature and definition of the soule is not much regardable, sundry of them being so monstrous and absurd. But it is a thing very considerable, that amongst so many stragling and wilde conceits all, or most of all at least of the noblest and the best Philosophers have taught the immortality of the soule it selfe. Howsoever, in other businesses concerning it, they might sometimes disagree. *Permanere animos arbitramur*, saith *Cecero*, *consensu nationum omnium*: *quæ in sede maneant qualesque sint ratione discendum est*, * and againe in his *Hortensius*, as witnesseth Saint *Augustine l.* 14. *de Trinitate*. *Antiquis Philosophis hisque maximis longeque clarissimis placuit quod æternos animos divinosque habeamus*. We are perswaded by the consent of all nations that soules remaine, but must learne of reason of what quality they are, and in what places they remaine. This assertion of *Cicero* Cicero Tuscul. l. 1.

Vo, for consent of nations and Philosophers in this truth, hath beene shewed to the eye by the great diligence and learning of *Augustinus Steuchus*, commonly called *Eugubinus*, in the 9 booke of his excellent worke *de perenni Philosophia*, in which he voucheth to this purpose the authorities of *Pherecides Syrus*, who, as *Cicero* witnesseth, was the first that delivered this verity in writing, also of *Trismegistus* and the *Chaldean* monuments of *Plato*, likewise *Pythagoras*, *Aratus*, *Philo*, *Cicero*, *Plotinus*, *Jamblichus*, *Hierocles*, and sundry others, as also of *Aristotle* the Prince of the *Peripatetiques*, who is judged by the greatest searchers into his doctrine to have directly taught the immortality, although he hath not declared himselfe in that point, as in many others, nor as others have done, peradventure concealing himselfe on set purpose, because he for want of light from divine revelation was not able to tell what to do with them after death, nor was he willing to make up his matter with fictions poeticall, as his master *Plato* had done. The same Philosophers also are diligently alleadged by *Monsieur Plessy*, in his booke *de veritate Relig. Christiana*, which is every where extant. Besides, the same doctrine of immortality hath beene constantly taught by the learned *Aben Sina*, or *Avicen* in the last booke of his *Metaphysiques*, and also in his *Almabad*, in which treatise he maintaineth constantly the immortality of the soule, but earnestly impugneth the bodies resurrection, and withall which is most false and improbable, defends that *Mahomet* in his law never taught it, but only parabolically and for fashion sake, complying with the peoples rudenesse, whereby they were not sensible of any doctrine teaching a felicity that was spirituall. Another *Arabique* author who goes under the name of *Aristotle* is of the same minde with *Avicen*: seeing, saith he, it is manifest out of the bookes of "the ancient, and already proved that the soule or minde, is not a bo- "dy, nor doth perish, but remaine &c. Thus he *l.* 1. *de divin. sap. secundum Ægyptios*, *c.* 2. consonantly to other Philosophers, though afterwards, in the very next chapter, most absurdly he affirmes as much of the soules of Beasts. Afterwards *c.* 4. he addeth, "saying. If our foreelders had beene doubtfull of the soules im- "mortality, they had never, for the confirmation thereof by natures "dictamen, made a law against which no man is, but he who is en- "tangled in vice. And a little after. The soule therefore passing out "of this life, and gotten into the otherworld, doth not at all perish. "Lastly *l.* 12 *a c.* 10. *ad* 17. he, by many arguments assayeth to prove "that the soule is void of corporeity." Thus he, of whose credit and excellency see the judicious censure of Doctor *Guiliel. Dunal* in *Synopsi doctrinæ Peripatetica cap. ultime.*

ugubinus l. 9. e Peren. Philo- oph.

leſs. c. 15. de erit. Christ. Rel.

Author secret. sap. secundum Ægyptios, p. 1, & 12.

Next

Next unto this Author I produce *Manilius*, yet, not as a light Poet, but as a ſage Philoſopher, he flouriſhed in the time of *Ceſa Julius*. This ſame ſame Author *l.* 1. *Aſtronomicon*, ſpeaking of the *Galaxia* and indeavouring to give a reaſon of it, writeth on the manner following.

Nec mihi celanda eſt famæ vulgata vetuſtas
Mollior ex niveo lactis fluxiſſe liquorem
Pectore reginæ divum, cælumque colore
Infeciſſe ſuo, quapropter lacteus orbis.
Dicitur, & nomen cauſa deſcendit ab iſta.
An Major denſâ ſtellarum turba Coronâ
Contexit flammas & craſſo lumine candet
Et fulgore nitet collato clarior orbis
An fortes animæ dignataq; nomina cœlo
Corporibus reſoluta ſuis, terraq; remiſſa,
Huc migrant ex orbe, ſuumq; habitantia cœlum
Æthereos vivunt annos mundoq; fruuntur.

Norwill we hide what ancient fame profeſt,
How milke that guſht from *Juno's* ſnowy breaſt
In heaven that ſplendent path and circle drew
From whence the name, as erſt the colour grew,
Or troopes of unſeene ſtarres there joyne their light
And with their mingled ſplendours ſhine more bright.
Or ſoules Heroïck from their bodies freed
And earthly partes, attaine their virtues meed
This ſhining Orbe, and from their lowly herſe
Aſcending high, enjoy the univerſe,
And live Æthereall lives.

And againe,

Jam capto potimur mundo noſtrumq; parentem
Pars ſua conſpicimus, genitiq; accedimus aſtris.
Nec dubium eſt habitare Deum ſub pectore noſtro,
In cælumq; redire animas cæloq; venire.

Of the whole world we'are now poſſeſt,
And cleare behold our Parent bleſt,
A part of him, and from theſe warres
Make our approaches to the ſtarres.
No doubt but under humane breſt
A ſacred Deity doth reſt;
And that our ſoules from heaven came
And thither muſt returne againe.

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Lo here how he doth ſignifie, not onely the ſoules of men be divine and immortall, but beſides, that they had not their originall from the earth, or from any earthly agent, with whom conſenteth a Greeke Philoſopher *Salluſtius Emeſcenus* in his booke *de Diis & mundo* lately publiſhed and vindicated from the moathes by *Leo Allatius*; This Philoſopher *c.* 8. teacheth on this ſort. "Firſt ſaith he, let us know "what the ſoule is. The ſoule is that which makes things living or "animated, differ from the liveleſſe, or inanimate. Their difference "conſiſts in motion, ſenſe, phantaſie, and intelligence. The ſoule de- "voyd of reaſon is a life that ſerves apparences and the ſenſes, but the "rationall, uſing reaſon, beares rule over the ſenſe and Phantaſie. In- "deed, a ſoule deſtitute of reaſon followes the affections of the body, "for it deſires and is angry without reaſon; but a rationall, according "to the rule of reaſon, contemnes the body, and entring into combate "with the ſoule irrationall, if it get the better doth follow virtue, if "vanquiſht declines to vice. This of neceſſity muſt be immortall be- "cauſe it knowes the Goddeſſe, and no mortall thing can know that "which is immortall; beſides, it contemnes humane things, as if they "were belonging to ſome other perſon, and being it ſelfe incorporeall, "is averſe from things corporeall, which bodies, if they be faire and "freſh, it languiſheth, if old, it begins to flouriſh. Alſo every diligent "ſoule makes uſe of the mind.

Salluſtius Emaſenc. 8.

"πᾶσα μὴ τὸ πνεῦμα ψυχὴ κέχρηται νῶ νοῦν δὲ οὐδὲν σῶμα γεννᾶ πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὰ ἀνόητα "νοῦν γενήσοι. the ſoule is not generated by the body, for how ſhould any "thing that wanteth reaſon generate that which hath? Thus *Sallu-* "*ſtius*, out of whoſe words we have, firſt, that the ſoule differs from "the body. 2. That the rationall from the irrationall, or the ſence; " 3. That the rationall is immortall and the reaſon why. 4. That it is ingenerable and for what cauſe. With this greeke *Salluſtius* agrees the Roman, who *l. de bello, Jugurth.* ſaying, *Ingenii egregia facinora, ſicut anima immortalia ſunt.* The egregious atcheivments of the wit are like the ſoule immortall, and, by and by, *Omnia orta occidunt, aucta ſeneſcunt, animus incorruptus, æternus, rector humani generis.* All things which riſe do fall, and being ever eaſed doe wax old, the minde is incorrupt and eternall &c.

Apollonius apud Philoſtrat. l. 8. de vita ejus.

Our next authority is that of *Apollonius Tyanæus* that famous Pythagorean Phyloſopher whoſe life *Philoſtratus Lemnius* hath writ at large, and amongſt other accidents, relates of him how, after his deceaſe, he appeared to a young man a ſtudent in philoſophy reſolving him as followeth. "The ſoule is immortall and no humane thing but "proceedeth from the providence divine. This, therefore, after the

"body

"body is corrupted, as a ſwift courſer releaſed from his bonds and "delivered from a troubleſone ſervitude, removeth up and downe "and intermingles with the gentle aire." Thus he, to whom conſenteth moſt expreſſely *Hierocles* in his commentary upon the golden verſes of *Pythagoras* in ſundry places, telling us that the ſoule is not only incorruptible, but alſo made immediately, not by procreation but the hand of God. See him of the Greeke and Latine edition of *Paris pag.* 101. 103, 132.

I will adde to theſe the words of the Emperour *Marcus Antoninus*, commonly called *Aurelius*, *l.* 4. *n.* 13. according to *Merick Caſaubon's* diviſion, "If ſoules, ſaith he, remaine how from all æternity "could the aire hold them, or how the earth retaine their bodies? As "here the bodies after they have lyen a while within the earth are "changed, and being diſſipated, leave ſpace for other carkaſſes; ſo ſoules "carried up into the aire, after they have beene there ſometime, whi-"ther kindled, or liquefied, are conjoined to the common χὴγ σπερ-"μάτικ☉, that is unto the originall mind, or great ſoule of the world." Thus he as if he had ſaid with *Solomon* the ſpirit returnes to God that made it, for the great ſoule of the univerſe, or the originall minde of all, is nothing elſe. *Horace* conſenteth, ſaying, *Melior pars noſtri vitabit lebitinam.* and *Tacitus in vit. Jul. Agric. Siquis piorum manib. locus: ſive ſapientib. placet, non cum corpore extinguuntur magnæ animæ, placide quieſcas.* If to the ſpirits of the pious there be any place remaining, if great ſoules be not together with their bodies extinguiſhed, mayeſt thou reſt in peace. To theſe *Ovid* ſubſcribeth *Metamor. l. ult.*

Marc. Antonin. l. 4. de vita ſua, n. 13.

Cum volet ille dies, quæ nil niſi corporis hujus
Jus habet, incerti ſpatium mihi finiat avi;
Parte tamen meliore mei ſuper alta perennis
Aſtra ferar nomenq́ erit indelebile noſtrum.

Come when it will my Deaths uncertaine hower
Which of this body only hath a power,
Yet ſhall my better part tranſcend the sky,
And my immortall name ſhall never die.

The ſame doctrine is conſtantly taught by *Pythagoras* as appeares by his doctrine of *Metempſycoſis* and alſo both *Jamblichus* & *Porphyry* in their ſeverall hiſtories of his life do witneſſe of him, as alſo *Diogenes Laertius.*

I conclude this Jury with the judgement of *Macrobius*, who *l.* 14. *in ſomnium Scipionis* after he had recited ſundry and differing fancies of ſeverall Philoſophers touching the nature of the ſoule, concludes,

Macrob. in ſomn. ſcipio. c. 14.

as followeth. "*Obtinuit tamen, non minus de incorporalitate ejus,* "*quàm de immortalitate ſententia.* Nevertheleſſe, the opinion touch- "ing the incorporeity of the ſoule, as well as touching the immortali- "ty of it hath beene prevalent." Againſt all theſe, therefore it im- portes little that *Dicæarchus Meſſenius* a Peripatetique Philoſopher & Scholler to *Ariſtotle*, or as *Ariſtoxenus* ſhould, as *Cicero* relateth in the firſt of his *Tuſculanes* and in his ſecond of his *Academiques*, hold and defend it to be mortall, or that both he, and as *Cicero* reporteth out of him, another more ancient Philoſopher, by name *Pherecrates*, one of the linage of *Deucalion*, did thinke there was no ſoule at all, neither in man, nor beaſt, and foraſmuch as concerneth the ſame *Dicæarchus*, we read in *Sextus Empericus* and *Tertullian*, as alſo in *Joh. Fr. Picus* of *Mirandula*, he was of the ſame opinion: for there is nothing ſo ab- ſurde which ſome one Philoſopher, or other hath not maintained. *Sextus Empericus* was of the ſame minde alſo as he *l. adv. Mathema- ticos* acknowledgeth.

Sextus Emp. l. 2. Hypotyp. c. 5. Fr. Picus l. 1. de Doctrin. vanit. Gentium, c. 14.

But now by the way, I note how ſublimely moſt of theſe heathen wiſe men did Philoſophize, when as they conclude the ſoules originall to be from heaven, and how much above the low pitch of certaine depreſſed ſpirits of this age, who after their continuall poring into objects materiall, and raking in the mudde of corruptible things, will needs draw out of that dirte the nobler ſubſtances of our ſoules and natures intellectuall by aſſigning for them no more perfect principle then generation, of which number this ſorry author againſt whom we now deale, is one, yea and one alſo of the groſſeſt that ever medled a- bout this buſineſſe, as by his demeanour in it doth appeare. *Hiero- cles* in expreſſe termes determines ſaying, It ſeemes ſaith he, that God himſelfe produced the ſeverall ſoules of every particular man and left the ſoules of Beaſts to be produced by the hand of nature, according to the judgements of *Plato* and of *Timæus* the Pythagorean; ſo he *com. in carm. aurea Pythagoreæ pag.* 133. of the Greek and Latine edition of *Paris Anni* 1583.

I know well, that amongſt theſe ancients the word *Anima*, or Ψυχὴ, is æquivocall, becauſe ſometimes it is taken only for an exhalation of purer bloud, ſometimes againe for Νοῦς, *Mens, or Animus*, τὸ ἡγεμόνικον by which words the ruling, the ſpirituall, and intellective, and laſtly the immortall part of man is ſignified; and not any materiall or fading ex- halation, which here by the way I note for the avoyding of exceptions and miſtakings.

Let us come now unto our Author who would gladly father upon *Ariſtotle, Nemeſius*, and *Ambroſius Paræus*, that the ſoule is all the externall

externall and internall faculties of man jointly considered. Which charge is strange, seeing it is well knowne that *Aristotle* defines the soule after no such way, but saith it is *Actus corporis Organici*, and a substance by which we live, have sence, and do understand; and if a substance then can it not receive intension, and remission, as every young Logician hath learned. But let us heare further.

All the faculties of man are mortall, as well those peculiar to man, as those other which are common to him with beasts, and if all those with his corpulent matter compleating man be proved mortall, then the invention of the soule upon that ground vanisheth, which thus I prove.

All elementary compositions or temperatures are mortall. But mans faculties, *a minore ad majus*, are temperatures. *Ergo* mortall.

The *minor* is denyed, namely that all mans faculties be temperatures; for, to instance, neither the understanding nor the will be temperatures, and yet are principall faculties of man.

He proves the minor. That which is subject to intension and remission is a temperature.

But such are all mans faculties, yea those of reason, consideration, science &c. All that distinguisheth man from beast are augmented by learning, education &c. lessened by negligence, idlenesse, and quite nullified by madnesse. *Ergo*.

Of this gallant argument there be but two propositions false, that is to say, both the *major* and the *minor* of it, and then what kinde a conclusion it hath, we may easily judge. For first, it is false that every thing is a temperature, universally speaking, which is subject to intension and remission, but such things only as be subject unto them *per se* and by their owne nature, and not by accident onely, and this appeares in the very businesse now in agitation betweene us; for a greater clerke then this man is will hardly ever prove that the augment, or diminution, which is, found in the acts of knowledge, do arise from any internall alteration in the intellective faculty, and not contrarywise from the difference, advantage, and alteration in the organ, or the species and formes intentionall: for this reason a man may understand better then a childe, not because his faculty intellective is better then a childes, namely for betternesse in the organe; also a learned man better then an illiterate, and a diligent then a negligent, because those may have acquired more species, or formes intentionall, or else have kept them better then these other that be illiterate and negligent, and not for any intension, or remission in the faculty. This I say may be reason of the difference and is likely so to be, and not any variation in

the

the faculty it ſelfe, notwithſtanding any thing which this Author hath ſaid, and therefore this proofe of his is defective and of no validity.

In the ſame ſenſe we deny the minor alſo, for it does not follow that the faculties rationall be more or leſſe, becauſe the acts of it be more or leſſe, in regard that there may be more cauſes then one of this intenſion or remiſſion, as namely, the ſeverall meaſure of the organe, as well as the ſeverall meaſure of the faculty it ſelfe. Wherefore it belongeth to this Author to prove that this ebbing or flowing of acts of knowledge, is to be referred to the ſoule's or underſtanding's, wainings and increaſes, and not to the differences of the Organs; which thing ſince he faileth to doe, his argument can by no meanes conclude, or be admitted as good.

He argueth againe. Temperature is a quality. A quality may be abſent without the deſtruction of the ſubject. Reaſon and underſtanding may be ſo, therefore they are temperatures, or qualities, and not ſubſtances immortall. The minor is proved by example of madneſſe, falling ſickneſſe, &c.

In anſwer, Firſt, I deny it to follow, that becauſe Reaſon is a quality, therefore it is a temperature, for there be many qualities which neither are temperatures nor belong unto them, becauſe no other qualities belong to temperature, but onely ſuch as be elementary.

Secondly, I deny abſolutely that reaſon, or underſtanding can be abſent without the deſtruction of the ſoule, or of man; I know the act of reaſon may be abſent, and the effluence of it hindred, more or leſſe, as in infants, mad men, apoplectique perſons, and ſuch like, but ſtill the root remaines, and without death cannot be removed. Hence I inferre againſt this Author, that although ſundry actuall intellections may be improved, or impaired by ſenſe, yet the radicall cannot, but is wholly independent. Nay further, even ſome acts of the ſoule are in the manner of working independent of the body and wholly inorganicall, as divers learned authours have ſhewed.

Some old authours have aſcribed to the ſoule a body Aëriall; but that it ſelfe was a body Aëriall or Elementary, I conceive none of them ever yet affirmed. What that obſcure writer ſaith whom he calleth *Woolnor* I neither know nor regard, for he is no claſſicall Author, nor have any voice allowed him in the Philoſophers Parliament.

The ſeverall abſurdities which afterwards this author labours to inferre doe not follow out of the doctrine of immortality, but onely out of his owne miſtakes, erroneous and ignorant conceptions, and therefore he may take them all home to himſelfe, which to doe I know it

must

muſt be to his great loſſe, for throughout his whole booke he ſwarmes ſo much with this kind of vermine, as they eate up all the ſubſtance of his undertakings and diſcourſe.

He addeth. Every forme depends of the matter, and by ſeparation periſhes. But we muſt tell him that this is falſe doctrine and can never be proved. If it were not ſo, ſaith he, then one might be generated without the other, a ſoule without a body, & a woman be brought to bed of a ſpirit.

I anſwer, that an immortall ſoule cannot at all be generated, as Firſt, being by it ſelfe and it's owne nature ingenerable; and Secondly, having no principle here on earth, either materiall or efficient, that is able to beget it, all agents created in this kind being impotent, as afterwards we intend to ſhew againſt this Author, as alſo againſt *Sennertus*, *Religio Medici*, and ſome others.

What reaſon is there, ſaith he, mans and beaſts Anatomy being both conſidered and compared together, that mans faculties in a higher degree ſhould be an immortall ſpirit more then of beaſts in a lower degree, but both elementary and finite?

For the finiteneſſe we grant you that both are finite, but not both elementary, or mortall, and this we collect not from the Anatomy but from the operations, by which we doe collect not a graduall difference betwixt the two ſoules beſtiall and humane, but an eſſentiall. So that call it reaſon which is in beaſts, or call it what you will, that reaſon which is in man is eſſentially ſuperiour unto it: and if that of beaſts be reaſon, then doth mans reaſon deſerve another better terme whereby to ſignify the eſſentiall preheminence of it, as *Campanella* himſelfe acknowledges in divers workes of his, and proves in his Metaphyſiques at large. We know that bordering nations doe a little ſymbolize in their natures, but yet are not therefore the ſame, ſo then, albeit the higheſt of vegetables, as the *herba viva*, or the *Agnus Tartaricus* (if there be ſuch a plant) and the *Zoophyta*, have ſome reſemblance to creatures of ſenſe, yet nevertheleſſe are they different from them, and the *Zoophyta* themſelves belong onely to one claſſe or other, and not to both. So in like ſort, although the moſt perfect of animals have acts of ſenſation that ſomething reſemble the apprehenſive, diſcurſive, and judging faculties of man, yet are they wholly and eſſentially diſtinct. Wherefore as ſome erroneouſly may imagine, the ſenſe in beaſts is not a weake or imperfect reaſon, nor againe, in man is reaſon a ſtrong and perfect ſenſe, for theſe two faculties be wholly different even in one and the ſame man, as manifeſtly appeareth out of the contrariety and

See Aquinas l. 2 contr. Gentes c. 66. & Ferrariensis. ibid.

disagreement which we daily doe experience betwixt the two judgments of reason and sense, as also betweene the two appetites sensuall and rationall, and the great repugnancy we find betweene them throughout our whole life, and by the great businesse and sharpe conflicts which are caused thereby, much to our cost and labour.

The opposition betwixt the indication of sense and the judgement of reason is evident: because the sense, for example, judgeth the sunnes diameter to be but a spanne; reason here opposeth and concludeth it to be much greater then the diameter of the whole earth. Infinite other examles might be given, but this one may suffice for all.

The disagreement of the two appetites, and how they draw severall waies and torture the heart of man, is evident, first, by every mans experience; Secondly, by the suffrages of the Gentiles. *Ovid* brings in *Medaa* complaining tragically in these words,

Ovid Metamorph. l. 17.

——Aliudq; cupido,
Mens aliud suadet, Video meliora proboq;,
Deteriora sequor.
A new-felt force my striving powers invades,
Affection this, discretion that perswades.
I see the better and approve it too,
The worse I follow.

Seneca in Hippol.

Seneca in Hippolyto accords,

Quæ memoras scio
Vera esse, Nutrix, sed furor cogit sequi, &c.
Good Nurse thy counsell I confesse is true,
But forc't by fury, I the worst persue.

The writings of *Pluto, Cicero, Seneca, Hierocles*, and other Philosophers abound with the doctrine of making resistance against passions and the unruly appetitions of the body.

Mark. 14. 38. Gal. 6, 15.

Lastly, the Holy Scripture is plentifull in this argument. *The Spirit*, saith our Blessed Saviour, *is willing, but the Flesh is weake.* And his Disciples advise, *Walke ye in the Spirit, and the desires of the Flesh you shall not fulfill. The spirit coveteth against the flesh, and the flesh against the spirit. I finde in my members a law leading me captive unto sinne. I doe not that which I will, &c.*

Thus we see what opposition reason finds in man from sense, but reason cannot be contrary unto it selfe, nor doth it struggle and strive with the owne powers & dictamens, and therefore is a different power from sense. And so much in answer to this chapter, omitting the particular examination of his other inferences of absurdities, as he cals them,

them, againſt the doctrine of immortality, becauſe either they are anſwered before hand in that which hath beene ſaid already, or elſe are ſuch ſenſeleſſe ſtuffe as they can afford no matter for any ſenſible anſwer.

Chap. V.

A refutation of certain ſhifting Anſwers given unto ſundry Texts of holy Scripture.

THe firſt place 2 *Cor.*5.6.8. where Saint *Paul* declareth, that *while we are preſent*, or *at home* ἐνδημοῦντες, *in the body, we are abſent from our Lord*, but he deſireth *rather to be abſent from the body, and to be preſent with our Lord.*

Out of this it may be inferred, not that immediately after death we all ſhall be preſent with God, and attein to glory, as this Authour idlely objecteth, but that during the time of our abſence from the body, we may be preſent with Chriſt and enjoy God, whether this be immediately after death, or no, about which point we do not now contend.

His anſwer is, that the Apoſtle ſpeakes not of the interim betwixt Death and the laſt Judgement, but of the ſtate of the Reſurrection.

This Gloſſe of his corrupts the Text, for the ſtate of the Reſurrection is not the ſtate of Separation, or ſeparated Soules; but the Apoſtle ſpeakes plainly and expreſly of abſence or peregrination from the body, which is the ſtate of ſeparation, during which ſtate, he might (as he ſayeth) be preſent with Chriſt. I do not deny, but that in the precedent and ſubſequent Texts he may ſpeak alſo of the Reſurrection; but it does not therefore follow, that he ſpeakes of that ſtate onely: and as for his words, they clearly beare witneſſe to the contrary; therefore after death, and before any re-union with the body the ſoule remaineth. And by this cleare ſenſe his ſecond ſhift is taken away, whereby he ſeekes to elude a like place of the ſame Apoſtle, *Phil.*1.23,24.

*Gen.*35.18. It is ſaid of a woman, that *her ſoule was departing:* therefore there was ſuch a thing as a ſoule that continued after death.

He anſwers, that the meaning was, *ſhe died.* Be it ſo, yet the words do not import that onely; but beſides, that this dying of hers was by the departing of her ſoule from her body, and not by the periſhing or deſtruction of the ſoule departing. For example, when we ſay, The enemy is departed from ſuch or ſuch a place, we do not mean, he is

ſlain, but onely gone, and do intimate that he is ſtill alive. She could not die, ſaith he, if her ſoule were living. This is both falſe and fooliſh, for it was not the living of her ſoule which made her live, but the being of it living within her body, and the informing of it with the ſame, as then this preſence and union of a living ſoule made her live, ſo on the contrary ſide, the taking away of this preſence and the diſſolving of this union muſt make her die; to which effect the living of her ſoule afterward, or the dying of it, was a buſineſſe impertinent; for whether it after lived or died, it being once ſeparated ſhe was dead and remained no woman any longer; for the ſoule of a man or woman is not a man or woman, though indeed the Platonickes together with *Cicero*, *Macrobius*, and *Hierocles*, not knowing any thing of the Reſurrection and of glorified bodies, yet being ſure that man was to remain and be rewarded after death, knew not how to defend this truth without their holding that the ſoule onely was the man, and the body but as a priſon of it, but *Ariſtotle* was wiſer than to thinke ſo, for he defined man, not *Anima rationalis*, but *Animal rationale*; and this Doctrine is truly Chriſtian and Philoſophicall, taught expreſly by *Marcus Varro apud Auguſtinum lib. 19. de Civit. dei cap. 3.* and by Saint *Athanaſius* in his Creed. *Anima rationalis & caro unus eſt homo.* A reaſonable ſoule and fleſh is one man, and by Saint *Methodius* Biſhop of *Olympus* in *Lycia*, and afterwards of *Tyrus*, *In excerptis apud Photium Cod. 224.* "Ἀνθρωπος λέγεται κατὰ φύσιν ἀληθέστατα, ὅτε "ψυχὴ χωρὶς σώματος, ὅτε αὖ πάλιν σῶμα χωρὶς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκ συγκάσεως ψυ- "χῆς καὶ σώματος εἰς μίαν τοῦ καλοῦ μορφὴν συντεθέν. A man according to na- "ture is moſt truly ſaid to be, neither a ſoule without a body, nor yet "a body without a ſoule, but a compound of them both joyned together in one forme and beauty: thus he, with whom conſenteth the Prince of Roman Hiſtorians *Criſpus Saluſtius l. de Bello Jugurth. Namuti genus hominum compoſitum ex corpore & animâ eſt, &c.* For as the race of man is compounded of body and ſoule, &c. All theſe according with *Ariſtotle*, who would not feigne falſe principles for the avoiding of true difficulties, which he could not ſolve, though now they diſſolve of themſelves, the Article of the Reſurrection and of glorified bodies having been revealed, which before was *Myſterium à ſæculis abſconditum*, A myſtery hidden from the beginning of the world.

Athanaſ. in Symb. *Aquinas 1. p. q. 75. a. 4.* *Method. apud Phot. Cod. 224.*

The reſt of the Authours evaſions of this nature are foreſtalled and prevented by this that hath been anſwered already, and ſo without any more adoe about them, may be diſmiſſed.

Feare not them, ſaith Chriſt, *who kill the body, but are notable to kill*

the ſoule. Therefore when the body is killed, the ſoule is not, neither can man kill it; and why, I pray you, but becauſe it is immortall? This objection can never be ſolved, neither will all his trifling and fooling about the ſignification of the word Hell, ſerve his turne; for let Hell be what it will, and where it will, yet ſtill it runnes, that the ſoule cannot be killed. But what the true and formall ſignification of the word ἅδης is, we may finde expreſly declared by *Euſtathius* in 1. *Iliados*, and *Anaſtaſius Sinaïta Quæſt.* 90. Contrary to the dreames of this man, and in particular, that formally it does not ſignifie the Grave; and if it did, yet it could be no place for ſoules that remained unkilled and quicke, for it were a very cruell courſe to bury ſoules alive, or to caſt them quicke into the grave. Moreover, that there is no Hell before the Reſurrection, is more than he hath proved, or any other for him, or elſe that none ſhall ſee God till then, even in the mean time, abſtracting from the controverſie that is agitated betwixt the Schiſmaticke Greekes on the one ſide, and the Orthodox Greekes and Latines on the other, for the moſt Schiſmaticall Greekes did not deny Hell or Heaven before the day of judgement, but onely that till then neither all men nor devils were made happy in the one, or tormented in the other: for the Schiſmatickes themſelves acknowledge that the Martyrs have the prerogative of the firſt Reſurrection, that is to ſay, they are happy before the Reſurrection of their bodies, and before the reſt of the juſt; or, which in ſubſtance is all one, they are admitted into Heaven and to the cleare viſion of God; or again, whether they will allow the viſion of God to be the happineſſe of the bleſſed, yet felicity is Heaven whereſoever it is, or in whatſoever good thing it conſiſts; and again eternall torments appointed for the reprobate be truly a Hell, whether it be in the centre of the earth, or no.

Euſtath. in 1. Iliad. prope initium; Anaſt. q. 90.

This day, ſaith Chriſt unto the Thiefe, *thou ſhalt be with me in Paradiſe*; but not in body, therefore in ſoule alone, and therefore alſo his ſoule ſtill lived after his bodies dying. He anſwers, that Chriſt himſelfe was not in Paradiſe that day; but this is a foppery, for though Chriſts humanity was three nights and dayes in the lower parts of the earth, yet his Divinity was that day every where, and beſides his ſoule was happy ſtill, and carried its Paradiſe along with it, ſo that the good Thiefe might be with Chriſt that day, and be in Paradiſe alſo.

Chriſt ſaid, *Luke* 22. *Father into thy hands I commend my Spirit.* And *Steven Acts* 7. ſaid, *Lord Jeſus receive my ſpirit.* But if the ſpirit died, there was nothing to be received. He anſwers, that his ſpirit

was his life. This ſhift was frivolous, for his life was to be loſt and deſtroyed and ſo was not commended into the hands of any.

Apoc. 6.10,11. *I ſaw under the altar the ſoules of them that were ſlain for the word of God, &c. and they cried with a lond voice, &c.* Therefore they were then extant and alive, or elſe they could not have been ſeen, nor cry: but it is certain that one impiety cannot be defended without more, and therefore as formerly, he depraves the Scripture, ſaying, not with the Scripture. *The ſoules of the ſlain*, or *of the men ſlain*: but with ſuch miſcreants as himſelfe. *The ſlain ſoules*, and that they cried, but like the bloud of *Abel*. But if it were meant no otherwiſe then thus, the bodies might then have cried alſo as well as the ſoules. The Text ſaith, it was the ſoules of the ſlain, and if the ſoules alſo had been ſlain, the Text would not have uttered it in that manner as now it doth; for it were an impertinent manner of ſpeaking to talke of the ſoules of the ſlain, if the ſoules had been ſlain and dead, as well as the bodies.

τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐσφαγμένων.

The other places, as that of *Eccleſiaſtes*, I have urged, as alſo the other of the Apoſtle, *who deſired to be diſſolved that he might be with Chriſt*, and this later I have enforced ſo farre, as I ſuppoſe it convinces and is unanſwerable, as the reſt alſo are. Behold here by example of this poore wretch how bold and ſawcy ignorance is growne ſince darkneſſe fell upon the face of the earth, for is not this with *Simon Magus* of ſet purpoſe *to pervert the right wayes of our Lord*, and to thruſt men headlong into perdition. But ſetting complaints aſide, which even when they are neceſſary be not gratefull, let us examine the later remnants of this Authours follies, and ſo leave him, if it may be, to repentance for them.

Acts 13.10.

Chap. VI.

The rationall Soule of man ingenerable and incorruptible.

WE have ſeen already that, by the conſent of the wiſeſt of all times and nations, the rationall ſoule is not ſubject to corruption, and that it hath not a period of time aſſigned it beyond which it muſt not paſſe; nor that it may ſimply leave to be and be annihilated as it were by the principles of nature it ſelfe, they not requiring any longer conſervation from the beneficence of the firſt cauſe; but contrariwiſe to be deſerted by it, as a late Authour vainly and without any probability at all, imagined; much according to the old phantaſie of the Stoicks, who, as *Cicero*, not without indignation and ſignes of deriſion, rehearſeth, *Uſuram nobis largiuntur, tanquam cornicibus*

Cicero l. 1. Tuſc.

cornicibus, diù manſuros aiunt animos, ſemper negant. "They allow us "a date, as they do to Crowes, they grant our ſoules ſhall continue "long, but that for ever they deny it: dealing in like manner with Soules, as ſome did with Oracles, whoſe ſilence they aſcribe to no other cauſe than impotency of ſpeaking any longer, the ſpirit that fed them expiring of it ſelfe, as being waſted and conſumed with age. One would judge, ſaith *Cicero*, theſe men ſpake not of Oracles, but of ſalſedges which by long keeping would grow unſavoury and ſtale. Certainly, theſe that judge thus of Soules and ſpirituall ſubſtances make an eſtimate of them, as they would do of trees, whoſe timber is of ſeverall ſolidity and duration, as if ſome of them were like Cedar wood, or Oake, which would laſt long; others as Cheſnut, or Elme, which be not of ſo long continuance; others again like Aſh, or Maple, which rotte within a while. This is light Philoſophy, worthy of deriſion more than confutation, and is a device not acknowledged by our Authours before alleadged, who give no limitation to the life of ſoules, but determine abſolutely a perpetuity:

Hic ego nec metas rerum nec tempora pono,
Imperium ſine fine dedi———

Without doubt that ſoule which hath withſtood and ſurvived the violent aſſaults of Death then when it was rent from the body and forced to ſurrender that beloved forte, there can be no ſuſpicion that it ſhould faile afterwards, grow old with time, decay and come to nothing, and all this without any other force. Beſides, if the ſoule be of a ſimple uncompounded nature, as intellectuall ſubſtances be, then can it not diſſolve, or which is all one, periſh by corruption; wherefore if the principles of nature, whereby the ſoule is conſtituted, admit of no deſition nor ending by corruption, there can be no reaſon given why theſe by exigence of nature ſhould not require to be continually ſuſteined in their being by conſervation from the firſt cauſe, and much leſſe, why at ſuch or ſuch a point of time or age, they ſhould require to be forſaken and by the withdrawing of the firſt cauſes benevolence, to returne unto their firſt nothing, wherefore I account theſe conceits of mortality and ayery poſſibilities of deſition to be unworthy of any further examination, but rather to be rejected, as inventions of contentious and ſophiſtique braines, that love to entangle all right threads of diſcourſe, and to obſcure thoſe lights which lead men unto truth.

Having ſeen all this in favour of an immortality of the ſoule, let us now behold as uniforme and favourable a conſent of the antient Sages for the divine originall of the ſame, and not humane by procreati-

on, as our impious author labours to maintaine. *Salluſte* the Greeke Philoſopher, in the place before alleadged out of him, ſpeakes plainely and tells us it cannot be produced by generation. *Manilius* derives their pedigree from heaven, as we have heard out of him already, which he elſewhere confirmeth ſaying,

Manilius.

Stetit unus in arcem
Erectus capitis, victorq; ad ſidera mittit
Sidereos oculos, propiuſq; aſpectat Olympum,
Inquiritq; Jovem; nec ſola fronte Deorum
Contentus manet, & cœlum ſcrutatur in alto,
Cognatumq; ſequens corpus ſe quærit in aſtris.

Cicero in ſomn. Scip.

Marcus Anton.

Cicero determineth, Saying, *His animus datus eſt ex ſempiternis illis ignibus quæ ſydera & ſtellas vocatis, quæ rotundæ & globoſæ divinis animatæ mentibus, &c.* *Marcus Antoninus* ſeemes to draw mens particular ſoules from the great and common ſoule of the world; and the Gentiles in generall doe acknowledge them to have a celeſtiall originall by the received fable of *Prometheus*, who compoſing the bodies of men of clay or earthly ſubſtance, is feigned to have ſtollen fire from heaven wherewith to animate and informe thoſe bodies, ſignifying thereby that the fires of earthly furnaces were not ſufficient for ſo excellent a worke.

Lavinus Lemnius.

The Philoſophers of later times are for the major part of them againſt the ptoduction of ſoules by procreation; amongſt the reſt, *Lavinus Lemnius l. 1. de Occultis naturæ Miraculis, c. 11.* ſpeakes much after the manner of ſome Heathens before alleadged, calling the ſoule *ſcintillam divinæ mentis*, which is a high expreſſion, yet not meaning (as literally it ſeemes) that it is any particle of the Deity, or any ſubſtance increated, but denoting onely the ſublimity of it, and that the originall is not from the earth. With him agreeth the great ſpeculator, *Johannes Argenterius med. ad. 1. Aphor. Hippoc.* The famous *Fernelius l. 1. de Adbitis rerum cauſis, c. 5, & 7.* declaring that the cauſe of all formes in generall is from heaven. *Andrew. Laurentius, l. 1. Anat. c. 1.* teacheth in expreſſe tearmes that the reaſonable ſoule is not generated, but created. I omit the rehearſall of more votes, and come to enquire after the cauſe why it cannot be generated like other formes.

Io. Argenterius Jo. Fernelius.

Andr. Laurentius, Fr. Valleſius.

In the head of this ſearch I propound the doctrine of *Cicero*, who *l. 1. Tuſcul.* hath laid the foundation of the truth. *Animorum, inquit, in terris nulla origo inveniri poteſt, &c.* "No origine, ſaith he, of ſoules "can be found on earth, for in the minde there is nothing that is mixt, "nothing concreate or bred from out the earth, nothing which is hu"mid, or aëriall, or fiery: for in theſe natures there is nothing which

Cic. l. 1. Tuſcul.

" hath the power of memory, of minde, or cogitation, which may re-
" taine things past, or provide for the future, and comprehend the pre-
" sent, which alone be things divine, neither is it ever to be found out
" how they might betide to man but from God onely; Wherefore
" the nature and power of the minde is singular and different from these
" usuall and knowne natures. For which cause whatsoever that is
" which apprehendeth, which is wise and willeth, and is vigorous, is
" heavenly and divine, and is of necessity eternall. So discoursed *Cicero*, and rightly also, if I be not mistaken.

The pressing home of this argument will consist of three points or heads; First, from the nature of the soule it selfe, which seemes to be an Entity not capable of being produced by generation; Secondly, from the nature of the things out of which it is to be educed; Thirdly, by the inhability of those actions which are exercised in generation for the production of any spirituall substance, or intellective faculty, although the soule in it selfe were a thing producible, and that the elements might afford sufficient materialls for the composing of it.

For the first I argue thus; no entity which is simple and unmixt can be produced by generation, but such is the intellective part of man, therefore that part is not to be produced by generation; and if ingenerable, then is it incorruptible also. That it is simple and unmixt, needs no probation, because it is a thing wholly improbable that an intellective power or substance should be a temperature or mixture, as our Adversary conceived it to be; for though a temperature and mixture may remotely, or a farre off, concerne understanding, in as much as they belong unto the Organs, yet is not an intellective Entity, therefore a compound or a bodily temperature, as by and by we are further to declare.

That no simple Entity is producible by generation is evident, because the *effect* or *terminus* of that action is the composition or compound, which thing it performeth not by producing the Entity of the parts, but by making a substantiall union betweene them, and by the making those severall entities to be parts, which although they were before, yet were not parts of that compounded body which by this newer generation did accrue. Besides this is the cleare and expresse doctrine of *Aristotle* in sundry places of his workes.

For the second head of probation I affirme that no lumpish matter or earthly concretion can yeild materialls for the building up of an understanding or minde. *Chymists* by their curious arts of dissolving bodies, have found out salts, sulphures, oyles, spirits, quintessences, Elixirs, they againe can draw tinctures and magisteries, and out of metalls, a vi-

triol which ſhall contain in it the eſſence of them and have the virtue of tranſmutation of other metalls into their own nature, but yet never any knew how to extract out of them any one dramme of underſtanding, or to fill the leaſt phiall with it; nor could they ever finde metall or oar which contained wit and underſtanding in it: *Arnoldus de villa nova*, as *Mariana* recounteth in his Spaniſh ſtory of Spaine, attempted by mixtures and furnaces, to make a man, but his art failed him and he was confounded; all his ingredients could not afford him an intellective ſpirit wherewith he might be animated and informed. You will ſay, ſenſe cannot be extracted any more than reaſon. True, but ſenſe ariſing from things diviſible may come by a reſultancy from things united, as being materiall, which reaſon, being immateriall, cannot eſpecially in the principall acts thereof which be wholly inorganicall, as by name, the acts of judgement be touching objects immateriall and *à fortiori*, all ſuch of them as tranſcend the Sphere of Nature. *Cicero* toucheth chiefely upon this point, and his argumentation ſeemeth to be very ſolid and irreſiſtible, if preſſed to the uttermoſt.

The third head of argumentation is from the improportion and imbecillity of the actions of humane generation; for firſt, the actions of vegetation and ſenſe are of an inferiour nature and ſo be unable to produce any thing higher and perfecter then themſelves; and for this cauſe each entity is to be produced by actions that be of the own claſſe and order; namely, *per actiones congeneres & cognatas*: therefore the ſoule if it were to be generated could not be ſo otherwiſe than by actions of underſtanding, or of the intellective; but it is certain, that generation is not performed by acts of wit or underſtanding, but contrariwiſe by acts of vegetation and ſenſe, which actions be of an inferiour degree; and a man generates with his body, and not with his minde; ſo that the generation of man is no more any act elicit of reaſon than his eating or walking is, which actions be no acts of the underſtanding, though preſcribed and directed by it; now though the act of the divine underſtanding be ſubſiſtent, yet the acts of created underſtandings be onely accidents; for ſuch and no better is the *verbum mentis* in all created underſtandings, humane or Angelicall, and therefore humane underſtandings beget no underſtandings, nor any children like themſelves. It followeth then, that the ſoule neither generates a ſoule, nor againe is generated by any, and for this cauſe muſt be incorruptible, and by the principles of Nature, immortall. By this it appeareth that the non-generation or traduction of the ſoule is a verity ſo evident, that by it the immortality may be proved, and it ſtands not in need to be it ſelfe proved by immortality.

For

For indeed, out of that which hath been delivered touching the non-traduction of the Soule by any ſeminall way or principles of propagation, the deduction of the ſoules incorruptibility will be a buſineſſe very plaine & eaſie, and this by virtue of a twofold conſequence. The former of which is drawn from the ſoules not generating, or active generation; the later from the not being generated, or paſſive generation.

Touching the former it is cleare, that whatſoever ſubſtance doth not generate that ſame is immortall, even by Natures univerſall proviſion and ordination; for as much as in all her workes ſhe affects one kinde of perennity or other, that is to ſay, either a perpetuity of the individuall by an indeficient ſtability of the naturall principles, or elſe at leaſt in the ſpecies by the intervention of generation and corruption: ſo that whereſoever there is no propagation or acts of generation aſſigned for the maintaining a ſecondary immortality in the ſpecies, there muſt of neceſſity be granted a primary and better immortality in the individuum. Hence it followeth, that becauſe a man doth not generate with his minde, but with his body, therefore his body is corruptible in it ſelfe, and perpetuall onely in the ſpecies; and again, that his minde or ſoule is immortall in it ſelfe and ſubjected no way to corruption, notſtanding in need of any helpe or ſupplies from generation.

Touching the later, it is manifeſt that every entity which is not produced by generation is not generable, and therefore not corruptible. That it is not generable we gather hence, becauſe whatſoever entity is by Nature generable, every ſuch entity requires, as by a connaturall way, to be produced by generation; as in like manner, every entity that is ſimple requireth, whenſoever it is produced, to be produced by no other way but creation. By this it followes, that whatſoever is produced and not by generation, is by Natures lawes ingenerable, and ſo by conſequence incorruptible and immortall, but the minde or ſoule of man is produced, and not by generation, therefore it is an entity incorruptible. That it is not generated, hath been proved before, as alſo that it doth not generate, for a minde or rationall Soule cannot generate nor be generated by any other agent then a rationall Souſe, nor by any other actions then acts of reaſon and underſtanding, by which acts ſince it procreates nothing which is like it ſelfe, nor intends to do it; the ſoule is neither generated, nor doth it generate, and therefore according to the principles of being, and the lawes of Nature, muſt be immortall and unſubject to Death or deſition, and not be in any poſſibility to be corrupted by the virtue of agents naturall.

The learned *Sennertus* being moved by certaine difficulties which he

could not overcome, was very inclinable to thinke the Soule is generated, and that the leed it ſelfe from the beginning is animated with a humane Soule, but he together with *Juſtus Lipſius* reflecting upon the conſent of Divines unto the contrary, doth with him religiouſly ſubmits, and ſubſcribes *Pareamus*. Let us obey. As for the ſaid difficulties, I do not finde them very urgent, but that they may conveniently be avoided, as we intend to ſhew in the next Chapter.

nnertus in ypom. 4. c. 10.

As for the reaſons themſelves which prove the immortality immediately without any dependency upon traduction from parents, or not traduction, they are often and plentifully exhibited, both by Philoſophers and Divines; as namely, by *Javellus l. de indeficientia Animæ*, written by him at the earneſt requeſt of *Pomponatius*, who was ſorry for his former errour and retracted it; by *Scaliger* in his Exercitations, by the *Conimbricenſes*, *Tract. de Anima ſeparata*, alſo briefely and pithily by *Euſtachius*, *Aſſellius a. S. Paulo in ſumma Philoſophiæ*, *Renatus de Cartes* in his *Metaph.* and his *Principia Philoſophica*, and ſundry others; and amongſt Divines, by *Aquinas* in both his Summes, *Raymund Sebunde* in his *Naturalis Theologia*, *Barthol. Sibylla in Quæſt. Peregg. Dec. 1. Lud. Vives l. de veritate fidei Chriſt. Poſtellus in Concordia Orbis*, *Savanarola in Triumpho Crucis*, *Velloſillus Adverteytiis in S. Auguſtiuum*, *Greg. de Valentia Tom. 1. Leſſius l. de Immortalitate Jo. Mariana l. de Morte & Immortalitate*, *Ferrarienſis*, *Philippus Faber*, *Collegium Complutenſe*, and others, eſpecially *Albertinus Tom. 1. Corol. & Alexander Valignanus apud Poſſevinum Tom. 1. Biblioth. Selecta. Thom. Campanella* in his *Metaph.* very copiouſly.

alig. Exer. 97. n. 20.

We trace and hunt out this immortality of it chiefely by the ſteppes of the operations, for *Sicut res ſe habet ad eſſe, ſic ad operari & vice verſâ*. The firſt operation is the underſtanding of objects ſpirituall which argues the faculty to be incorporeall, for as the reaſon why a corporeall eye cannot ſee a ſpirit, is becauſe it is corporeall, ſo the reaſon why an underſtanding can ſee it is becauſe of a perfection it hath devoid of corporeity. It is not needfull that the power and the object ſhould be alike *in eſſe entis*, as *Aureolus* objecteth, but onely *in ratione motivi & mobilis*, or which is all one, *in ratione cognoſcentis & cognoſcibilis*: but yet it is neceſſary the power ſhould be free from all impediments of knowledge or perception of ſuch excellent objects, amongſt which, ſeeing corporeity is one, as appeareth by the impotency in the eye corporeall, for ſeeing of a ſpirit, therefore the power which ſees a ſpirit, as the ſoule doth by making a judgement of it cannot but be incorporeall and a ſpirit, and ſo beyond the lawes of generation and corruption.

ureol. in 2. ſt. 19.

The

The ſecond operation of the underſtanding is the knowing of ſpirituall things by abſtraction from ſingularities and materiall objects after a manner immateriall, and by penetrating into the quiddities or eſſences of things, for of theſe conceal'd and hidden entities unto which our ſenſes can have no acceſſe, the ſoule of man gets ſome intelligence and attaineth of them notices, though not perfect, intuitive or comprehenſive, yet not contemptible or untrue; neither are theſe eſſences temperatures, as *Baſſon* and ſome others fondly and without probability do imagine, as is elſewhere to be ſhewed.

A third is a reflection upon it ſelfe, which acts are above the nature of matter.

Againſt abſtraction ſome object, that it is no perfection, but rather an imperfection, that manner of knowledge being confuſed; but this objection is inefficacious, for ſuppoſing the infirmity of humane underſtanding, the force of underſtanding things abſtractedly is moſt perfect and diſtinct, and of all other hath the leaſt confuſion in it; though in ſuch underſtandings as be above humane, and are able with one view to comprehend, abſtraction is needleſſe and no perfection. As for humane underſtandings we finde by experience that the meaner and groſſer they are the leſſe they can abſtract, and indeed abſtraction in the underſtanding is a ſubtle act and like to extraction in Chymiſtry, which takes the purer parts from the fæculent, and reſolves bodies into their ſeverall native parts, which before did lie confuſed in one heape and mingled together.

A fourth is, the eminency of the acts of underſtanding, which argue a principle nobler and higher than any mortall entity. This argument is largely proſecuted by *Leſſius*, *Mariana*, and *Campanella*, and before theſe by *Cicero*.

A fifth head of probation is from the appetite of man that can be ſatiated with nothing but eternity, the deſire of which is univerſall and infinite; this deſire being generall muſt needs be from Nature, and therefore right and not a vicious rapacity or greedineſſe, as *Pliny* ſeems to make it, and ſo being right cannot be fruſtrate. Neither do beaſts aime at perpetuity, for though they flie pain, yet properly ſpeaking, they do not flie death, nor have they any apprehenſion of it as they have of paine, or as we have of death, which under the proper likeneſſe we abhorre and flie, and do aime directly at a perpetuity, not ſo much of being as of life, I ſay diſtinctly, of life, becauſe every man who lookes into his own heart will there perceive, that he ſhould be as willing to be nothing as be a ſtone, and again, not leſſe unwilling to be a ſtone, and be extinguiſh'd, than to be annihilated and blotted out

of the book of Nature; for it is not the book of Nature in which we deſire to be regiſtred, but in the Book of Life, perpetuity without life being not eſteemed by us, nor life without perpetuity.

Beſides, it is no queſtion but that Nature by her giving life and underſtanding to man intended it for his benefit, now a knowing or intelligent life that muſt have an end by a perpetuall death, is no benefit at all, but rather an infelicity, and therefore man by dying payes a large tribute, for the life was lent him, and returnes to Nature more than he received from her, and the intereſt he payes amounts in that caſe to more than the principall; becauſe in one death (come when it will) there is more acerbity included and greater bitterneſſe than there could be jucundity or content betwixt the largeſt termes of living, or in the moſt fortunate ſucceſſes that ever were; ſo we may indeed juſtly and properly be ſaid when we die to pay, and to pay alſo with advantage our debt to Nature: for what thing more diſcontenting than *fuiſſe aliquando & non eſſe, vixiſſe & non vivere*, to have been ſometimes and not to be any longer, to have had a life or living ſpirit and now not to have any, but to be throwne for ever amongſt the dead, and to be caſt downe as low as lumpes of earth or heapes of ſtones? It is commonly received as a truth, that there is nothing ſo afflictive as once to have been happy as not to be ſo any longer. And indeed if the caſe were ſo with man that Death ſhould devoure him wholly and put an end to all, extinguiſhing both him and his deſires together, the complaint of *Pliny* againſt Natures harſhneſſe might ſeem not to have been made without juſt cauſe, namely, that ſhe is illiberall to man, *Cujus cauſâ videtur cuncta alia genuiſſe, magnâ & ſævâ mercede, contra tanta ſua munera; ut non ſatis ſit æſtimare parens melior homini an triſtior noverca fuerit*, that is, upon ſuch hard conditions that it were not eaſie to determine whether ſhe had ſhewed her ſelfe towards him like an indulgent mother, or a cruell ſtepdame, *Sohe l. 7. in Proem.* and rightly, ſuppoſing, as he falſely did, the ſoule of man to be mortall, foraſmuch as out of that erroneous conceit this abſurdity or rather impiety muſt follow.

Turpiùs ejicitur quàm non admittitur hoſpes.

For what is the benefit of an ending life? Is it not to taſte of light and living that you might feel the griefe of looſing it, which otherwiſe you would not have d one, and to be ſhewed and made infinitely enamoured of a felicity which you are never to enjoy, but to be barred of for ever; Could there be invented a greater corraſive to mans heart than this? If things ſh ould thus go with man, we might reſemble his ſtate to a Gueſt that ſhould be entertained for one night with

all the dainties, the welcome and delight that might be, and the very next morrow to be ſent to the Gallowes, there to make a concluſion of his joyes and welcome. In fine, whatſoever is not perpetuall is nothing, and mans heart cannot receive true content from any thing which he is to looſe and whoſe poſſeſſion is not without date immortall, *Non eſt mortale quod opto.* Our hearts aſpire not after any thing which is mortall, neither when we have conſidered well doe we ſay within our ſelves, *Aut Cæſar, aut nihil*; but, *Aut æternum, aut nihil.* Not to be *Cæſar*, or nothing, but to be eternall or not at all: for as *Marcus Antoninus* rightly ponders, and like a man of wiſedome, after death is once come; *quid habet ille qui vixit tribus ſaculis plus illo qui vixit triduò?* what hath that man who lived three ages left him more then any other that lived but three ſingle dayes. *Marc. Anton. in l. de vita ſua.*

This argument though it prove another life after this yet doth it not directly evict there ſhall be no interruption of living in the ſoule untill the reſurrection; nevertheleſſe it perſwades it ſtrongly becauſe the faireſt way of perpetuity is by continuing it in the ſoule, and by the leaving there a pledge for a totall accompliſhment to follow after, and the more becauſe this dying of the ſoule is an improbable invention, and ſuch as in Philoſophy or Divinity hath no foundation, but rather indeed is a great ſteppe to infedility, for if men have much adoe to perſwade themſelves that after the body is dead and rotten it ſhall have the aſhes gathered together and riſe againe, they would finde much more difficulty if they ſhould thinke that the ſoule it ſelfe was mortall and to be extinguiſht, and ſo in the whole man nothing left of life.

A ſixth probation is from the abſoluteneſſe and independency of humane will, which matter is well followed by *Aureolus in 2 ſent. diſt. 19.*

A ſeaventh is drawen from the benignity and juſtice of God in favouring the good and giving recompence for all their labours and ſorrowes in this life; which recompence ſince it is not given in this life, it muſt be in another, and ſo there muſt be another life. I confeſſe alſo that this argument though it prove a ſecond life yet doth it not exclude an interruption of living in the ſoule more then it doth in the body; for at the reſurrection a compleate recompence may be made both to ſoule and body, notwithſtanding they both had beene extinguiſht for a time; but yet becauſe this fancy of the ſoules being extinguiſhed is not proved by any one argument which is conſiderable, therefore that ſame medium which proves a ſecond life after the departure

parture from the body, proves also a continuance of the second with the first, for no Philosopher or Divine of note hath hitherto beene found so devoid of sense, as to dreame of any interruption of living in the soule, but that if it was to live after death it was to doe it continually, or if it died then it was to live no more for all eternity, so that this mans reviving of soules is an errour as absurd and improbable as his resurrection of beasts, which is the expresse doctrine not of Christ the great and true Prophet, but of the grand Impostor and false Prophet *Mahomet*, both in his *Alcharon* and the Bookes of *Sonna*, as *Guadiomolus* reciteth out of him in his Booke against *Achmet Ben. Zin* a *Persian Mahumetan*.

Some labour to evade this argument by saying that no such recompence is necessary in another life, because a full amends is made in this. If you aske them how, they tell you that *Virtus divitiis animosa suis, nec indiga laudis est præmium sibi*; Virtue is rich and is a reward unto her selfe.

This saying is nothing but a Stoïcall tumour or swelling which hath no solidity in it; for first, say it were a reward, yet not rightly distributed or dilated; for how small a portion of mortall men are sensible of this aiëry reward? Secondly, mans reward is his felicity, and therefore must be both great and perpetuall; but this same reward is a very slender one, and besides the slenderneſse it is of small duration, out of which it followes that this contentment received from virtue is no sufficient recompence, nor reduceth things unto equality; nor lastly, commends or justifies the providence of God. Thirdly, this contentment received in the soule from virtue cannot keepe the vertuous from being miserable, because this solace is received onely in the minde or soule, notwithstanding which content, he may be in poverty, captivity, sickenesse, in *Perillus* his Bull, or upon the racke; in which cases as the body suffering for a good cause receives contentment from the soule; so in like sort the sorrowes be reciprocall, for the soule is made partaker of the miseries of the body, and is afflicted by meanes of it, so that in fine here is no full and cleare contentment but a mixture of joy and sorrow, and consequently here is no desired reward or felicity, neither of soule nor body, and much lesse of the whole man who consists essentially of both, and is totally to be rewarded, and not the one halfe of him alone, whether soule or body. *Num*, saith *Anastasius Sinaïta Quæst.* 73. *Quando oportebat certare, corpus plus sudoris expressit, quando autem est tempus coronarum sola coronatur anima*? Shall the body endure the greatest trouble in the conflict, and soule alone receive the crowne or comfort? this were no justice or equity. Certainly

ly a man in this ſtate would ſtand in need of patience, which virtue I thinke was never neceſſary for the happy man but for the afflicted, nor for the enjoying of felicity but the enduring of miſery. In ſumme, it were a fury to thinke, that while theſe two parts of man, body and ſoule, are linked together, that one halfe of him can be happy while the other is miſerable, or that the reward of the ſoule alone is the reward of the whole man, and able to give him ſatisfaction. The Stoickes invented for man this harſh and miſerable felicity for ſupplying the defect of their doctrine touching providence and humane felicity, which they could not patch up otherwiſe then with ſuch rotten ſtuffe as this, which will not hold the examination, nor indeed can be without the Chriſtian doctrine of the reſurrection. So that albeit reaſon alone without revelation cannot prove the reſurrection to be, becauſe this effect exceeds the virtue of naturall cauſes, there being allowed in nature no regreſſe *a privatione ad habitum*, yet reaſon proves that article to be very convenient and credible for an accompliſhment of all, and without which there is no way remaining, either for the juſtifying of providence or the rewarding and beautifying of man; or laſtly, for the giving any life and encouragement to virtue.

Eighthly, the doctrine of the ſoules immortality is the foundation of virtue, without which ſhee muſt needs fall unto the ground; this is clearely ſhewed by *Leſſius*, and long before him by the Platonique and Heathen Philoſopher, *Hierocles*. "Unleſſe, ſaith he, ſomething ſhould "ſubſiſt in us after death fit to be adorned with verity and virtue, "which ſubſiſtent thing without doubt is no other then the reaſona-"ble ſoule, we ſhould have no pure deſire of honeſty or virtue. For "the ſuſpicion of an aboliſhment would choake the deſires of theſe, "and divert us to corporeall pleaſures of what ſort ſoever or whenſo-"ever they might be gotten by us. And according to that doctrine "how could it ſeeme the part of a prudent or moderate man not to "be ſo indulgent to his body as to grant it all things, ſeeing the ſoule "in that caſe was preſerved for the bodies ſake, and of it ſelfe had no "exiſtence, but accrued unto man from the conformation of his body? "Or why under the name of virtue ſhould we moleſt our body, if the "ſoule ſo periſh with it, as virtue her ſelfe can have no ſubſiſtence left, "for whoſe ſake we endure death"? Thus farre *Hierocles*, and that very cordially and truly.

I might adde here the arguments of *Scaliger*, *Excercit.* 308. *n.* 20. of *Aureolus Renatus des Cartes*, and divers others, but theſe alone well explicated and conſidered are ſufficient.

Theſe are the cheife ſeates of arguments, from whence Authours

doe usually fetch them, which how more or lesse valid or perspicuous they may seeme, yet have they beene held for good by the wisest Philosophers both Heathen and Christian, and to be concluding. But howsoever that be, the verity it selfe hath beene counted certaine and evident, insomuch as *Aureolus* himselfe although he found difficulty in sundry of the arguments, yet did he not doubt to say, speaking of the soules immortality, *in 2 Sent. dist. 19.* "This doctrine of faith is to be "held undoubtedly, and it is the common conception of the minde, "and a verity evident of it selfe, though to give a reason for it it is not "so easie". So *Aureolus*, with whom consenteth *Cicero* when as he said, as hath beene before alleadged out of him, that it is the consent of all Nations. "Now, saith he, if the consent of all be the voice and ver-"dict of Nature, then are we to thinke the same". Besides how could so many Heathen Philosophers have acknowledged unanimously this doctrine of immortality otherwise then by the light of nature and common reason? out of which it is plaine, that naturall reason doth teach us this verity. It followeth then, that by *Ciceroes* judgement whatsoever the arguments be, the doctrine it selfe is not onely true but also certaine and evident; which thing may very well be, for there be many truths which are not proved easily or evidently, yea peradventure are not to be proved at all, but be things most evident and indemonstrable; nature and the understanding acknowledging and embracing them as legitimate, without any further argument then her owne light; and againe, many things be knownely false which nature rejecteth as spurious and false, although she be not able to demonstrate that they involve any repugnancy or contradiction; so that in divers verities we are to rely lastly upon *Tertullian's Testimonium animæ.*

reol t in 2 t. Dist. 19.

Chap. VII.

Mans being by Procreation no argument of his soules mortality.

That mans soule must have the being by generation, because the man himselfe hath his being by it, is no good consequence; and the reason why some have beene deceived in judging it to be a good one, or that of due his soule ought to be generated as well as the soules of Beasts, hath beene partly a false apprehension what the true nature and essence of generation was, and partly also what was the perfection and essence of man.

As for the first mispriſion, it was that generation was not onely to make

make the *compoſitum* or whole to be, but alſo the parts, by the conferring unto them not onely the being parts but alſo the ſimple being, or the being Entities, that is to ſay, not onely the formality of them, but even the naturality; which conceipt of theirs is a falſe conception & againſtall reaſon and principles of Philoſophy. Which clearely teacheth us that it is man which is procreated or made by generation, and not his ſoule, his body is made or framed by it, and not the matter of which it is compoſed. For it is a received maxime and moſt true, touching the power of naturall cauſes, and no farther. *Quòd ex nihilo nihil fit*; Of nothing there is nothing to be made: out of which it followes, that before generation both matter and formes of all corporeall things muſt have before hand a being in *rerum natura*, at leaſt an incompleate one, and cannot poſſibly have it from generation; wherefore by the worke of generation they are not made, or receive any new abſolute entity, but onely are collected, ordered, and at laſt ſubſtantially linked and united one with another, which union is not by a ſole approximation, contiguity, or *juxta* poſition, that I may ſo ſpeake of one of them with another, as it falls out in artificiall compounds, where colours for example, though they be not pictures, yet being thus or thus choſen, formed and united, make up ſuch or ſuch a picture; but it is by a continuity or an inward and ſubſtantiall knot which is in our power better to conceive then explicate, and yet not to conceive fully neither, for theſe principles of generation are natures *arcana*, her darkeſt and moſt ſecret miſteries, which like the ſprings of *Nilus* ſhe hath hidden from our eyes, as if our ſeeing of them were a prophanation, and to let us know that ſhe is our mother, and we but ignorant children and ſuch who muſt not be made much acquainted with our originall.

Againe, if the parts alſo muſt be generated, I aske whether theſe parts be ſimple or compound entities? If ſimple, they cannot be generated, but muſt have their being by creation; if compound, then if they muſt be generated, the parts alſo of which thoſe parts are made muſt in like ſort be generated; and ſo either *in infinitum*, or elſe at leaſt, till we come to ſome parts which are ſimple and ingenerable; by which diſcourſe it followes that no parts at all, neither corporeall nor ſpirituall, neither in man nor beaſts, doe receive their being by generation.

Touching the ſecond miſpriſion or originall of errour and miſtaking, note, that although it belong to the perfection of an Animal to generate another like it ſelfe, yet is it a perfection onely to Animals and Vegetables, and to them alſo not ſimply but onely *quatenus corruptibilia*, ſo farre forth as they are corruptible, generation being inſtitu-

ted onely for reparation of decayes, and to reëdify the ruines of corruption; so that whereſoever there be more ruines, in that place more reedification is needfull. In creatures therefore irrationall where there is a corruption more large then in the rationall, a fuller manner of generation is neceſſary, becauſe there is a greater decay in the forme in the one then in the other, foraſmuch as the formes of irrationall creatures be by corruption disformalized and diſſipated into their atomes, which diſſipation if the formes were ſpirituall needed not; and againe, if indiviſible were a thing impoſſible. Therefore generation is to performe more in one then in the other, and yet ſufficiently in both, according to their ſeverall exigences. Seeing then generation is nothing but *productio viventis a vivente in ſimilitudinem naturæ*; a production of one living thing by another in a ſimilitude of nature; according to the definition thereof, whatſoever agent ſhall doe this that ſame is truly and univocally ſaid to generate, how much more or leſſe ſoever it doe beſides this. A man therefore producing another man by the onely compoſing and uniting his two eſſentiall parts, body and ſoule, maketh that to be a man which before was none, and doth truly generate a man, although he no more produce his ſoule, then he does the matter of which his body is formed and made; for there can be no more neceſſity for the production of the one then of the other. And this one inſtance of matter will evidently deſtroy our adverſaries argument taken from procreation.

Neither is it, as *Argenterius* well declareth, any imperfection in man not to generate ſo fully as other Animals doe, but rather a great perfection in him; for as it is a perfection in beaſts to generate totally as much as generation can doe, becauſe they are toally corruptible as much as in nature it is poſſible, and as in Angels it were an imperfection to generate, becauſe they by their nature are totally incorruptible; ſo in man it is a perfection to generate as Angels doe not doe, and alſo not to generate ſo totally and fully as brute beaſts doe generate, becauſe he is as the Philoſopers rightly and aptly terme him, *Horizon mundi & nexus naturæ utriuſq́*; as it were, the Horizon of the world and that which knits corporeall and ſpirituall natures together by his participating with them both, and not fully agreeing with either: not being ſo corruptible as beaſts, nor ſo incorruptible as Angels or pure Intelligences. By which it followes, that his manner of generation is in ſomething to agree with the non generation of Angels; and againe, ſomething with the totall generation of creatures irrationall, that ſame generation of his being truly and univocally a generation, becauſe he is univocally and truly an Animal, and yet not totally ſo, becauſe in his

immortall ſoule, he reſembles the incorruptibility of Angels or Intelligences. For *Modus generandi ſequitur modum eſſendi: & ideo quod partim eſt immortale & partim non, partim etiam generare debet & partim non.* That which is not wholly mortall doth not wholly generate, and therefore neither man nor beaſt doth generate wholly, yet a beaſt more wholly then a man.

Conſtat aternâ poſitumq́ lege eſt,
Vt conſtet genitum nihil.
Eternall lawes doe ſo ordaine
That nothing gotten ſhall remaine.

Wherefore if ſome of him after corruption doe remaine, there can be no neceſſity that all of him ſhould be made by generation; nay ſeeing ſomething more of him, namely the forme after corruption, doth remaine incorrupted then there doth of Beaſts, for of beaſts the matter onely remaines, ſomething leſſe of him is to be produced by generation then there is of them, though all of neither. Whoſoever therefore ſhall affirme that a creature intelligent like man ſhould generate another of his owne kind as totally and adequatly as one beaſt does generate another, doth not ſpeake like a Philoſopher, and beſides doth unjuſtly diſparage and diſgrace his owne linage, and violates the rights of his creation.

CHAP. VIII.

A ſolution of the Adverſaries objections, together with ſome others of Doctor Daniel Sennertus.

THeſe former *notandums* having beene premiſed, we need not dwell long upon anſwering of objection, for by them the way is opened already, and that which before hath beene delivered will not need any more then application.

Object. 1. Whole man is generated by man, therefore all his parts, both ſoule and body, and if both be generated then both are mortall.

Anſw. Whole man is generated by man, I grant it. Therefore both ſoule and body are generated. I diſtinguiſh. That both ſoule and body are made parts of man by generation, and a creature produced like in nature to him that generates; I alſo grant and doe affirme that by doing of this onely the compleat act of generation or procreation is performed according to the received definition of generation before exhibited in the Chapter precedent. But that both ſoule and body muſt

be, therefore made and have their Entities or beings given them by procreation; that consequence I deny as false and absurde, yea so absurde as it suffers a thousand instances to the contrary in all sorts of Animals. For example, a whole horse is generated both matter and forme; and yet his matter did not receive any being by generation, and so it falls out in other creatures. If then it be not necessary that the matter receive the being by procreation, though the whole Animal consisting of matter and forme be truly generated, what reason can there be why to the generation of the whole Animal, a new being of the forme, by vertue of procreation should be necessary? or why can one be necessary to generation, when as we see evidently the other is not? or why againe should we exact the new production of either of them by generation, when without any such act the definition of generation is fulfilled, and agrees both unto the generation of beasts, whose matter is not generated, and to the generation of man, whose forme is not generated, any more then his matter is? By force of this solution all his imaginary absurdities which he labours to fasten upon the non procreation of the soule, doe of themselves dissolve.

See *Argenter. com. in Aphor. 1. Hippocr.*

If the soule, saith he, be infused, then Christ did not take whole humanity from the seed of the woman.

Answ. He received from the seed of the woman as much of the humanity as was to be received thence, and that which he tooke did not come unto him by procreation, nor was it so to doe. As for the fourteenth to the *Hebrewes* which he cites for his purpose, our answer to it is, that it is not found in our bookes, neither Greeke nor Latine, neither do the Editions of *Raphelengius* or *Elzevir* contain any more Chapters than thirteen.

If saith he, we consist of soule and body, and are not men without both, and receive not our soules from him, (he meanes the Generatour as I suppose) then *Adam* is the father of no man, nor Christ the Son of man, because his manhood's constitutive part, even that which should make him a man, could not be by the seed of the woman, and a man is as much a father of fleas and lice, which receive their matter from him, as of his children.

Answ. Surely fleas and lice, whence soever they receive their matter, do not proceed from him in likenesse of Nature; as by the definition, they if they were generated by man, ought to do. Moreover, they are not generated by man, but of him, neither is he the agent but the patient, and so is of these vermin no generatour at all proper, or improper. Secondly, men do receive their soules by force of generation, although they be not generated, and so, not withstanding this non-gene-

ration of the ſoule, *Adam* might truly and univocally be the father of all men; and alſo the ſoule of Chriſt might come by the ſeed of the woman, although it were not made or procreated by it.

If the ſoule (addes he) be infuſed after the conception, then there is growth before there is life, which is impoſſible, for the ſoule is made, the vegetative as well as the motive, ſenſitive, or rationall part.

Anſw. I grant, that before the infuſion of the ſoule there may be vegetation, and this by the ſole virtue of the ſperme; but I deny that therefore there be in man more ſoules than one, that is, than the rationall: for this ſame force of vegetation which is in the ſeed holdeth it ſelfe upon the part of the matter onely, and doth not performe the office of a ſoule, or forme, the ſubſtance and operation thereof, being no more than to faſhion an organicall body and to make it fit for the reception of the ſoule and the union with it, after whoſe infuſion both the vitall and animal ſpirits do but ſerve as inſtruments to it, and to accompliſh the body in making it, to be ſo perfectly organicall as the eminency of a rationall ſpirit, above other formes, doth require to have it.

If the ſoule be not generated but infuſed into a dead body, then, ſaith he, it is lawfull to be Nigromancer; for Nigromancy is nothing but putting a ſpirit into a dead body, and ſo it is imitation of God, and God the onely Nigromancer, and all the men in the world but Nigromanticke apparitions, whoſe ſpirits when they have done the worke for which they were put into the bodies, deſert them as other conjured Ghoſts do.

Anſw. See the ſhallowneſſe of this man who can neither ſpeak right, nor reaſon with common ſenſe and probability. He calls Necromancy conſtantly Nigromancy, and he ſuppoſes that a ſoule in a dead body makes a living man, and can exerciſe vitall actions in it, or actions of life, and ſo, according to his groſſe capacity, if the ſoule be infuſed God muſt be a Necromancer and men but Necromantique apparitions; for this *Ignoramus*, it ſeemes, knowes no difference between a ſoule and body that are united and thoſe that are not united, but together onely, nor between a body living by the virtue of the ſpirit, and by virtue thereof doing vitall actions, and another which is onely moved and inhabited by a ſpirit, without any union with it or participation of life. But, ſuppoſing all were one, yet were it not lawfull to be a Necromancer, becauſe nothing at all be it never ſo good, is to be done by ſuperſtitious actions, or by making any recourſe unto the Devill, and acknowledgement of his power by any dependency of him whatſoever, more or leſſe.

It

It is granted, saith he, that the body considered meerly sensitive cannot sin and is but an instrument, or as the pen in the hand of the writer. Therefore if the soule be infused, then of necessity, the immortall thing and not our mortall flesh is the authour of all sin, and so God's immediate hand the cause of all sin.

See Soto of this in 4. d. 43. q. 1. a. 2. Rat. 3.

That the body is onely an instrument of the soule, is false, for it is a living co-agent with it, and a partaker both in the good and evill actions, and so is both rewardable and punishable with it; whether in the mean time it be created or generated, for this variation makes no difference in this matter of merit or demerit; neither doth the creation of the soule make God the authour of sin, more than the generation of it, that is to say, not at all, for still the soule and body are authours of their own actions, and the deformity ariseth from their misdemeanour, and not from God's creation or concurrence.

Doctour *Sennertus*, although he admit not of any mortality in the soule, yet he holds it probable, that it comes by procreation, and that from the first instance of conception, the seed is animated with the rationall soule: which Doctrine of his, by his leave, inferres mortality: for whatsoever is generated, is corruptible, and is to go out, according to the ordinary Lawes of Nature, at the same gate of corruption at which it entred in. Neither is it true, or likely, or lastly, any way philosophicall, to say as he doth *Hypomn. 4. c. 10.* that nothing created is immortall by the principle of Nature, but onely by the free will or gift of God; because as it is amongst bodies, some are very durable, as Marble and Cedar, some by and by corrupted, as flowers and fruits, even out of the severall natures of their composition which God hath appointed for them, and not out of the free will of God immediately, without any further relation; so in like sort, some substances are perpetuall out of the nature of their being, as spirituall substances and bodies that are simple and unmixt, other some, out of their own Natures, corruptible, as those that are mixt and made up of Elements, which as by some naturall agents they were knit up together, so by the operation of other some they are dissolvable. Soules then if generated are compounds, and if so, may be uncompounded by the agency and operation of causes naturall; wherefore to seek an immortality onely from a decree extrinsecall, without any foundation in their naturall beings, seemes neither to be philosophicall, nor true; wherefore the immortality of Soules and Angels is not to be reared upon this weak foundation, according to which a Flye may be as much immortall as an Angel, one by Nature, according to *Sennertus*, having no preheminence over the other. the free determination of God for

their

their perpetuall conſervation being equally applicable to either of them.

Conformably to this poſition of his he will needs have the ſperme alwaies animated with a reaſonable ſoule; but then conſider how many more ſoules are caſt away without any bodies organicall and humane, then are actuated and preſerved by bodies. I aske what muſt become of theſe innumerable ſoules? muſt they periſh, or have bodies made them at the Reſurreection? neither of theſe two can be admitted without great temerity and abſurdities. *Sennertus Hypomn.4. ca.10. & lib. de conſenſ. Chymic. cum Ariſt. & Galeno c.9.*

Beſides this, we know God did not inſpire *Adam* with a living ſpirit while he was a lumpe of clay, but when he had a face and a body that was organicall, and not before. Againe, why does the ſoule depart from the body, but onely becauſe it leaves to be organicall? why then, or with what probability can we imagine the ſoule is in the inorganicall ſperme? certainly, with none at all.

The winde that did drive *Sennertus* upon this inhoſpitall ſhoare was the neceſſity of aſſigning a *vis formatrix*, or a λόγῳ πλαστικῷ, that is to ſay, an able architect, or former of humane body, which though moſt acknowledge to be the ſeed, yet *Sennertus* ſees not how this can be, unleſſe it ſhould be animated with the ſoule; his reaſon is, becauſe the ſoule onely is to build an houſe fit for it ſelfe to inhabit. But this reaſon of his is not urgent; nay more, it is not likely; for egges and young birds do not build their own neſts, but the old ones for them; ſo that it muſt, by this account, be the fathers office to erect this new building and not the childes. But, how, ſayes he, can the father do this? eaſily and well, by ſending his ſperme as his deputy and officer, to performe that duty, as *Argenterius* alſo teacheth; which entity hath derived to it from the generatour ſo much naturall ſtrength and cunning as to make a ſufficient architect for the effecting of this work, and all this may be done with the only forme of ſeed, without any animation of it with a ſoule. Thus, it is likely, that the Acorne, for example, without any more forme than of an Acorne, collects fit particles out of the elements and materials about it, and by a virtue derived from the tree on which it grew, formes out and faſhions the body of an Oake: and for the effecting of this worke the ſeed participates tmch of the natureof the tree or plant, and hath ordinarily much of he ſame virtue: wherefore in this abſtruſe queſtion or quere that we may ſay ſomething which is likely, and hath for the truth thereof probable examples and inſtances in Nature, we do conceive that λόγῳ πλαστικῷ, or forming virtue, is the ſeeds own forme excited and aſſiſted by the breeding, cheriſhing, and connaturall warmth of the maternall body, *Argent. com. in 1. Aphor. Hipp.*

which doth environ it; as in the procreation of birds it ſeemes to be, where the *ſemen* of the Cocke being cheriſhed and ſtirred up by the ambient and incumbent warmth of the Hen, is that which changes the egge, and formes it into the ſhape of the bird from whence it came. Neither is it probable, that in ſo ſmall a *coagulum* or ſeed, which came from the Cocke the ſoule or eſſence of a Cocke is reſident.

Now, whereas he tels us, that by the bleſſing granted to all Creatures by the Creatour of them in theſe words, *Increaſe and multiply*, force was given to every ſoule to multiply another: we confeſſe it to be true; yet this not to be done by creating of the younger by the elder ſoules, or by the giving of them new entities; but rather by doing ſome other act out of which theſe formes ſhould connaturally follow, as materiall formes they do by a reſultancy, and immateriall by creation from a higher cauſe, which creation is to follow, and is due by a regular ordination & exigence of Nature; and ſo they may truly be ſaid to be given and communicated, though not made, by the force of generation. And this is the true *vis prolifica*, and not that other which *Sennertus* feignes unto himſelfe, by which he will have one humane ſoule to beget another, and on the inſtant to become with childe of it, no bodie knowes how; neither by what particular operation, nor from what Mine it ſhould be digged. For this manner of ſpeaking makes ſhew rather of ſome empty Magicke, than of ſound Philoſophy, and ſeemes altogether as hard and impoſſible as the eduction of them out of the potentiality of the *materia prima*, when underſtood in that ſenſe in which he himſelfe impugnes it.

If the Parents (objecteth *Sennertus*) do not give the ſoule which is the forme of man, they do not generate the man; but for certaine, they do generate the man, therefore they give the ſoule alſo; unleſſe they communicate the ſoule, like ſhould not generate his like. So he *Hypomn. 4. cap. 11.* In briefe, I anſwer, that the Parents do give and communicate both Forme and Matter, but that worke they may well do without the making or the producing either of them. It is certain they give the Matter, and it is as certain they do not produce it, wherefore the ſame may be ſaid of the Forme without prejudice to the eſſence of generation, or which is all one, of one like or *ſimile* producing of another. And that there is true generation, without producing either part, appeareth plainly; for Death which is the oppoſite to generation, and deſtroyes what the other made, will ſhew us what generation is; but Death is onely a diſſolution of parts united, and not a deſtruction of them; it is deſtructive, not of the matter or forme,

but

but of the man: for do but divide a mans ſoule and body and he is deſtroyed, and remaines not a man any longer, but loſeth what he had got by generation, that is to ſay, by generation he got to be a man, and by dying he loſes it. In fine, as *Argenterius* rightly anſwereth, Generation is not of the parts, but of the *compoſitum*.

He addes, if the ſperme, from the firſt inſtant, be not animated, and the generatour dye in the *interim* before the animation, it might be ſaid, that a dead man did generate. I deny the conſequence, becauſe that Parent while he was living did that act, by virtue of which all the reſt (as their turnes came) did follow, and that one and firſt act was generation, and not the ſubſequent. As for example, he is ſaid to make a fire who firſt puts the fire to the fewell and kindles it, though all do not burne of a great while after, becauſe all the reſt did follow in virtue of the firſt act. See him in 1. *Aphor. Hip.*

Thus we ſee that the arguments of *Sennertus* were not ſo urgent and weighty as to be able to hinder a wiſe Chriſtian Philoſopher, as he was, from relinquiſhing this tenet of his, and from piouſly ſubſcribing his *Pareamus*, by which act he left behinde him an example worthy of great praiſe, and of all true ſtudents to be imitated. I have added to the Authour's Objections, whom I undertook to impugne, theſe out of *Sennertus* who is a Writer of great worth and ſubſtance, to the end that by occaſion of his difficulties, the matter in hand might be explicated with more ſatisfaction, and for mine own ſatisfaction alſo, who was weary with fighting with a ſhadow.

Chap. IX.

The Adverſaries reſurrection of Beaſts exploded, together with a Concluſion of the Worke.

IT is uſually ſaid, that one folly brings on another, and ordinarily one worſe than it ſelfe, and ſo it fals out with this wretched man againſt whom we deale at this preſent, who after his groſſe errour of mans totall mortality, fals into one which is much groſſer, yea, ſo abſurd, as it is to be numbred amongſt the moſt ridiculous that ever were maintain'd even by *Mahomet* the father of abſurdities, and who was better at that worke, than any man that went before him. But at the length what may this errour be? I will give it in his own words, and it is this:

All other Creatures (ſaith he) ſhall be raiſed and delivered from Death at the Reſurrection, my reaſons and ground for it, be theſe. Firſt, that otherwiſe the curſe in *Adam* would extend further than

the bleſſing in Chriſt, contrary to the Scriptures, *For as in Adam all die, even ſo in Chriſt ſhall all be made alive*, 1 *Cor.*15.22. Thus he, abuſing Scripture, as we ſee, for the upholding of this his prodigious folly. Surely, the man when he reſolved upon theſe things was given over into reprobate ſenſe, and permitted (for his greater confuſion) in ſight both of God and the world to fall into ſuch an *Abyſſus* of abſurdity as that no man might take harme, or be ſeduced by him but ſuch onely who had a minde to be deceived.

It ſeemes then by this beſtiall Doctrine, that at the Reſurrection all the Gnats and Fleas that ever were ſhall be revived, all the Toads and Frogs and poyſonous Serpents and other vermin. Certainly, thoſe who are to live amongſt all theſe are likely to have gallant time of it. His places of Scripture which he profanes in alleadging to prove this need no expoſitor nor anſwer to them, for I thinke no reader is ſo ſimple as cannot do it by himſelfe. Doubtleſſe both according to the common principles of Chriſtianity, and alſo thoſe particulars of this Authour, Chriſt is the cauſe of our Reſurrection, and none are to riſe but thoſe onely for whom he died, and therefore ſince he died not for beaſts, they are not to have any Reſurrection.

As for the Aſſertion, it is groſſer and more inexcuſable in this Authour, than it was in *Mahomet*, becauſe this *Mahomet* made a Paradiſe and felicity agreeing moſt of all to beaſts and men of beſtiall diſpoſitions, for as it is well knowne out of the *Alfurcan* or *Alchoran*, and as *Theophanes* an ancient and faithfull Hiſtorian relateth. "His Paradiſe "was a place of corporall eating and drinking, of wantonneſſe with "women, where there was a River flowing with wine and hony and "milke, together with an incomparable beholding of women, not "not theſe we have now, but of others. Alſo long laſting plea-"ſures of obſcenity, and other ſuch things full of luxury and folly. So writeth *Theophanes*. But this man who will ſeem a Chriſtian might have learned out of the Goſpell a felicity of an higher ſtraine, one purely refined from all dregs of baſeneſſe and carnality, and that the bleſſed ſhall neither marry nor be married, but live like the Angels in Heaven, not enjoying the felicity of a ſwine, but a celeſtiall. Wherefore leaving *Mahomet* and other beaſts with him to enjoy ſuch a felicity as they deſerve and feigne unto themſelves; I paſſe unto our Authour's laſt folly, which is his calling it a Riddle, that the ſoule immortall is all of it in all, and again, all in every part, wondring how this ſhould be, and holding it a meer fiction and thing impoſſible: but I for my part do not wonder, that a man of ſo groſſe a wit and narrow a capacity, as he in this book hath ſhewed himſelfe, ſhould not under-

Theophan. apud Porphyr. c.17. & Jacob. de Vitriaco l. Hiſt. Orient. c.6.

underſtand this Doctrine or ſaying, eſpecially if he will judge of the nature of indiviſible preſences by thoſe that are diviſible, as it ſeemes he does. Yet I have cauſe to wonder why ſo ſtupid and ſo ſorry a fellow as this is, ſhould dare to hold it to be a Riddle or impoſſible, onely becauſe he with his ſmall wit is not able to underſtand it; as if forſooth, nothing were poſſible to Nature or to God the Authour of Nature, ſaving that alone which he underſtands how it can be done. I am now quite weary of this man, and ſicke with raking ſo long in ſuch a heap of dirt, and therefore at this inſtant I leave him to bethinke himſelfe about making a timely recantation.

Now, turning with delight unto my Reader, to ſolace and refreſh my ſelfe after all this travaile, I deſire him to look into *Hierocles* Commentary upon the Golden Verſes aſcribed to *Pythagoras*, in which he ſeemeth to have diſcovered the originall of this pernicious errour, touching the ſoules mortality. *Hierocles in Carm. Pyth.*

"What availes it, ſaith he, "with perjuries and murders and other wicked wayes to gather "wealth and to ſeem rich unto the world, and to want thoſe good "things which are conducible unto the minde? But beſides, to be ſtu-"pid and inſenſible of them, and thereby to augment the evill, or if "they have any remorſe of conſcience for their offences, to be tor-"mented in their ſoules, and affraid of the puniſhments of Hell, com-"forting themſelves with this alone, that there is no way of eſcaping "them, and from hence are ready to cure one evill with another, and "by a perſwaſion that the ſoule is mortall, to ſooth up themſelves in "wickedneſſe, judging they are not worthy to have any thing of "theirs remaining after death, that ſo they might avoid thoſe puniſh-"ments, which by judgement ſhould be inflicted on them; for "a wicked man is loath to thinke his ſoule to be immortall, for feare "of the revenges that are to follow his miſdeeds. Wherefore pre-"venting the Judge who is below, he pronounceth the ſentence of "death againſt himſelfe, as holding it fit that ſuch a wicked ſoule "ſhould have no longer a being nor ſubſiſtence. Behold here the foun-"tain head of this errour opened and purged by *Hierocles*.

In fine, from whatſoever puddle this errour ſprung, let us remember what *Socrates* (being to die) delivered touching the various condition of ſoules after this life. "He ſaid, as *Cicero* relateth, there "were two different pathes or voyages of ſoules at their departure "from the bodies, for all ſuch as with humane vices had contaminated "themſelves, and were delivered wholly up to luſt, with which as "with domeſticke vices being blinded, they had by lewd actions de-"filed themſelves, or had attempted againſt the Common-wealth any *Cic. l. 1. Tuſcul.*

"crime, or fraud inexpiable, that theſe had a wandring way aſſigned "for them, ſequeſtred from the aſſemblies of the Gods; but ſuch "againe as had preſerved themſelves entire and chaſte, contracting "little or no contagion from the body, having alwayes retired and "withdrawn themſelves from it, and had in humane bodies imitated "the converſation of the Gods, theſe found opened for them an eaſie "way of returne to them from whom they proceeded at the firſt.

This is the Doctrine both of *Cicero* and of *Socrates*, what then remaines to do but to hearken attentively to the wiſe Counſell of the Prince of Philoſophers *Ariſtotle*, and to ſuffer it to have a powerfull influence into all the paſſages of our life? His words *l.*10. *Ethic.c.*9. according to the diviſion of *Andronicus Rhodius* be as follow. "If then, "ſaith he, our underſtanding, in reſpect of man, be a thing divine, ſo "that life which is lead according unto the underſtanding, if compa- "red with life humane, is divine alſo; neither, as ſome perſwade, is it "lawfull for a man to reliſh and follow onely that which is humane, "and being mortall, thoſe things onely which are mortall, but as much "as in him lieth, he ought to vindicate himſelfe from all mortality, "and to take ſpeciall care that he live according to that part which is "moſt excellent within him. Now that which is beſt within us is "our minde, which though it be ſmall in bulke and weight, yet in "power and excellency doth ſurpaſſe the reſt. And with this wiſe counſell of the Philoſopher I conclude this whole Queſtion, which though the day of every mans departure will decide and give a finall reſolution to it, yet in the mean ſeaſon, are not diſputes of this nature fruitleſſe or ſuperfluous, becauſe if they be well performed, they are like burning torches, which in the darke gallery of this life teach us how to direct our ſteppes, and before that blacke day come, to helpe us for the making our preparations before-hand, that ſo with better hopes of ſafety we may meet our deadly enemies in the gate. Without all doubting for the repreſſing of brutiſh, beſtiall and unworthy affections; and again for our encouragement to noble and generous deſignements, the beſt preparatives againſt Death, there is no conſideration ſo powerfull and efficacious as that one of the high perfection of mans ſoule, and the immortall nature and condition of it, for, as *Cicero* obſerveth *l.*1. *de legib.* *Qui ſe ipſum vîdit primùm aliquid ſentiet ſe habere divinum, ingeniumq́, in ſe ſuum ſicut ſymulachrum aliquod dedicatum putabit, tantoq́, munere Deorum ſemper aliquid dignum faciet & ſentiet.* "He that doth know himſelfe will forthwith finde within "him ſomething that is divine, and will hold his underſtanding as a "ſtatue dedicated, and be alwayes thinking or doing ſomething an-

"ſwerable

*Ariſt. l.*10. *Ethic.c.*9.

*Cicero l.*1. *de legib.*

"swerable to so great munificence of the Gods. That is to say, he will be mindfull, that as in upright shape of body and the perfection of his spirit, he excelleth beasts and all creatures irrationall, so he will endeavour to do in the condition of his living, by disdaining to stoop to any thing which is base, or to defile the house in which his soule inhabits with any unworthy or ignoble actions.

I will seale and signe this whole dispute with the determination and censure of the book of Wisedome, which book whether it be received into the Canon, or no, yet is it confessedly very ancient, and therefore by consent of all may claime a just precedence of authority before any Heathen Philosopher whatsoever, the words are these, *Justorum animæ in manu Dei sunt, & non tanget illos tormentum mortis, visi sunt oculis insipientium mori, illi autem sunt in pace.* Sap. 3. The soules of the just be in the hands of God, and the torment of Death shall not touch them. To the eyes of the foolish they seemed to die, but they remain in peace. Behold here in the judgement of this venerable Authour, what kinde of people they are who hold the soules mortality, namely, ἀνόητοι, such as be destitute of true judgement and understanding. This is not my censure, neither is this character of my making; for who am I that should presume so farre? but it is the judgement of the ancient Authour of the Book of Wisedome, whose yeares and credit may deserve regard, even amongst those spirits that be most confident of their own conceptions, and be the greatest admirers and idolaters of themselves. In fine, this ancient Sage brands all deniers of our soules immortality with the selfe same note of ignominy, that *David* the kingly Prophet did marke that wretched mortall who closely and in his heart had said, *There is no God.* Psalm. Yet there is this ods between them two, and worthy to be observed, for though both of them be impious and absurd, yet one of them had some shame in him and said it onely in his heart. But this Adversary of ours goes further, and had the face to publish his impiety in Print, or at least the heart so to do it, as he himselfe might lie concealed, and his name unknowne; which covert way of his though it appeare not altogether so bold and bad, as if he had put his name unto his worke, yet was it an act too bold for any Christian man or true Philosopher to exercise, or to be an Authour of in Print; for alas, after so many great Divines and deep Philosophers, whose uniforme suffrages we have for the dignity of man, that is to say, for the soules immortall nature and incorruptibility, how could the cogitations unto the contrary of this poore worme be a matter any way considerable with men of understanding and ability?

FINIS.

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